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THE FSA, INTEGRATED REGULATION, AND THE
CURIOUS CASE OF OTC DERIVATIVES
Dan Awrey*
With a view to better understanding the optimal structure of financial
regulation, this paper tests prevailing theoretical hypotheses respecting the
efficiency and overall desirability of integrated financial regulation
relative to competing institutional models. This test is conducted through
the lens of a comparative case study examining the approaches adopted by
(fragmented) U.S financial regulators and the (integrated) U.K. Financial
Services Authority (FSA) toward the myriad of regulatory challenges posed
by the emergence, growth, and systemic importance of over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives markets. More specifically, this paper examines why,
despite the numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the
FSA adopted a non-interventionist regulatory regime governing OTC
derivatives markets which was both functionally equivalent to the
fragmented U.S. regime and, arguably, socially sub-optimal. This paper
argues that the FSA‟s approach to the regulation of OTC derivatives
markets may potentially be explained on the basis of a combination of (1)
poor coordination, (2) the FSA‟s attempts to balance competing regulatory
objectives, (3) incentive problems which arise for national regulators in the
context of global financial markets, and (4) the inherent limitations of
financial regulation. Each of these potential explanations holds important
insights for the ongoing debate respecting the optimal structure of
regulation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past three decades have been characterized by seismic changes in
the structure of global financial markets. These changes have sparked a
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pronounced shift in many jurisdictions toward greater integration of the
public institutions responsible for financial regulation. This shift has been
fueled by a perceived need for the structure of regulation to reflect the
increasing integration, globalization, and complexity of financial markets
themselves. Conspicuously, the momentum toward more integrated
financial regulation has historically been met with resistance in the United
States (U.S.), where responsibility has long been split between a cacophony
of federal regulators including the Federal Reserve Board, Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). More
recently, however, lawmakers, regulators, and pundits—including the
Obama Administration itself2—have criticized the ―gaps,‖3 ―weaknesses,‖4
and ―loopholes‖5 manifest within this fractured regulatory framework as
having contributed to the market and regulatory failures that precipitated
the global financial crisis.6 Many of these criticisms, if not for the recently
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act), have been accompanied by calls for regulatory reform
founded upon the perceived superiority of integrated regulation.7
In evaluating the merits of these proposals for structural reform, U.S.
policymakers would be well advised to look across the Atlantic to draw
lessons from the experiences—and criticisms8—of the integrated regulator
that many observers, not so very long ago, considered the blueprint for the
2. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION
AND
REGULATION
(2009),
available
at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (explaining the weakness
of current approaches to financial regulation and suggesting a number of reforms).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. See, e.g., Ashok Vir Bhatia, Andrea Maechler & Paul Mills, Strategic Priorities for
the Reform of U.S. Financial Regulation, compiled in Int‘l Monetary Fund [IMF], United
States: Selected Issues, at 28, IMF Country Report No. 09/229 (July 13, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23145.0 (follow ―Free Full Text‖
hyperlink) (enumerating several instances in which the Treasury‘s new regulatory
framework leaves unresolved problems surrounding cross-agency implementation).
7. See, e.g., THE COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A P LAN
FOR
REGULATORY
REFORM
(2009),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFCCCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (setting forth a plan for regulatory reform to address the
deficiencies in the current system exposed by the financial crisis).
8. See, e.g., Laurence Norman & Natasha Brereton, U.K. Regulator Defends Its Role –
Conservatives Would Scrap FSA, Divide Its Duties; Creating a Lame Duck?, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2009 (describing the FSA‘s defense of its regulatory model to Conservative Party
threats); Rowena Mason, MPs Blame „Impotent‟ FSA Over Icelandic Banks, TELEGRAPH,
Apr. 4, 2009 (describing the FSA‘s failure to act on strong warnings that Icelandic bank
Kaupthing was not capable of running a U.K. business); and Tories Target U.K. Market
Regulator, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009 (describing the Conservative Party‘s stance towards
the FSA).
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future of financial regulation: the now ill-fated United Kingdom (U.K.)
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Amongst the wide ranging criticisms
of the FSA stemming from the global financial crisis has been that the
U.K.‘s unified financial services watchdog failed to regulate over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives9 markets effectively. OTC derivatives—
financial instruments, the value of which are derived from (hence the
name) another asset commonly referred to as the ‗underlying‘10—have in
recent years emerged from relative obscurity to exert a profound influence
on global financial markets. On the eve of the crisis, the outstanding
notional value11 of all OTC derivatives stood at over USD$516 trillion,12 up
from USD$80 trillion13 less than a decade earlier, and several times the
global (M3) money supply. The growth and proliferation of OTC
derivatives have also generated complex, systemically significant
relationships between derivative, underlying, and related markets.
However, despite their explosive growth and systemic importance—to say
nothing of the foreshadowing provided by the derivatives-related collapses
of, amongst others, Barings PLC, Orange County, and Long Term Capital
Management—OTC derivatives markets remained, prior to the crisis,
effectively (if not always legally)14 outside the perimeter of financial
regulation in every major financial center. The relative dearth of public
regulatory intervention into these markets can be explained in many
jurisdictions, at least in part, with reference to pre-existing institutional
9. The term OTC is used to denote those derivatives which do not trade on an
organized or regulated exchange.
10. All derivatives are engineered from two basic financial building blocks: options
and forwards. These building blocks can be combined in an infinite number of ways and
with reference to an infinite number of underlying, thus facilitating the truly stunning
diversity of instruments observed within OTC derivatives markets. See Ed Murray, UK
Financial Derivatives and Commodities Markets, in FINANCIAL MARKETS & EXCHANGES
LAW 265-300 (Michael Blair & George Walker eds., 2007). Given this diversity, it is
perhaps not surprising that different types of OTC derivatives (bilateral swaps versus
securitizations for example) may manifest different risks and, accordingly, pose different
regulatory challenges. As will become apparent, the purpose of this paper is not to delve
into the decidedly complex task of identifying the specific risks associated with each species
of OTC derivative or the optimal regulatory response.
11. While illuminative of the size and growth of OTC derivatives markets, notional
value—effectively the benchmark against which cash flows are calculated in the context of
OTC derivatives transactions—is effectively a second-best proxy for their market value
(which, from an accounting perspective, nets out at zero for bilateral instruments).
12. BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 24 (Dec. 2007) (presenting
figures as of June 2007). The outstanding notional value of all OTC derivatives peaked at
over USD$683 trillion in June 2008, just three months before Lehman Bros. announced that
it was filling for bankruptcy protection. BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY
REVIEW 32 (Dec. 2008).
13. BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 32 (Nov. 2000) (presenting
figures as of December 1998).
14. As we shall see, OTC derivatives fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the FSA.
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pathologies. Most infamously, the 35-year long dispute between the SEC
and CFTC has been frequently identified as a source of chronic regulatory
failure.15 But what about the FSA? What about integrated regulation?
The purpose of this paper is to examine why, despite radically
different institutional models (to say nothing of the perceived theoretical
superiority of integrated regulation), financial regulators in the U.K. and
U.S. generated functionally equivalent regulatory regimes governing OTC
derivatives markets. The answer to this question in turn manifests
potentially important implications for a broader question: Does the
institutional structure of financial regulation matter? These questions will
be examined through the lens of a historical and substantive comparison of
the pre-crisis regulatory regimes governing OTC derivatives markets in
both the U.S. and U.K. This inquiry yields three related contributions to
the scholarly and public policy debates concerning the optimal structure of
financial regulation. First, it tests prevailing theoretical hypotheses
respecting the strengths and weaknesses of integrated regulation against the
real world regulation—and regulatory outcomes—generated by regulators.
Perhaps most importantly in this respect, insofar as the relevant scholarly
and public policy debates have thus far centered around its potential
efficacy within particular political or market contexts, the orientation of
this inquiry in terms of examining the effectiveness of integrated regulation
in response to a specific and pressing regulatory challenge is both novel
and, as we shall see, illuminating. Second, this exploration builds
incrementally upon our still-fledgling understanding of the institutional
pre-conditions (and other potential impediments) to the effectiveness of
integrated regulation. Finally, and more broadly, this exploration generates
potentially valuable insights respecting both the incentive problems that
arise in the context of the national regulation of global financial markets
and the inherent limitations of regulation within highly complex and
dynamic environments. Each of these contributions manifest potentially
important lessons for policymakers seeking to identify the optimal structure
of financial regulation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II provides a foundation for the
present inquiry by canvassing the theoretical arguments both for and
against integrated regulation. Part III begins by stating the case for why
OTC derivatives markets represent a compelling case study within the
context of the present inquiry. The remainder of Part III is then dedicated
to a historical and substantive comparison of the pre-crisis regulatory
regimes governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S. and U.K. Drawing
upon these foundations, Part IV explores potential explanations for the
FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of OTC
15. See infra Part III(b).
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derivatives markets and examines what lessons we can draw from these
explanations in terms of the optimal institutional structure of financial
regulation and, more broadly, its limitations.
II.

INTEGRATED FINANCIAL REGULATION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

A.

Integrated Regulation Defined
Recent decades have witnessed a pronounced shift toward greater
integration of financial regulation.16 Evidence of this shift can be observed
in jurisdictions with such diverse financial and political systems as
Germany, Japan, Thailand, Iceland, Estonia, and—before the recently
announced break-up of the FSA17—the U.K.18 However, for all the
attention surrounding this shift, the various manifestations of integrated
regulation have not yet coalesced—either in theory or practice—around a
single institutional model. Broadly speaking, and for the purposes of this
paper, integrated regulation refers to the integration of: (1) rule-making,
supervision, and enforcement of prudential19 and conduct of business20
(and, potentially, consumer protection) regulation;21 and (2) regulation
governing each of the banking, securities (including investment
management), and insurance industries.22 It must be observed, however,
16. See, e.g., Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three?
International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision at 3-4 (IMF Working
Paper No. 06/57, 2006) (presenting a cross-country analysis of experiences with integrated
financial supervision).
17. See David Enrich & Laurence Norman, U.K. Shakes Up Its Bank Regulation, WALL
ST. J., June 17, 2010, at C1 (describing the elimination of the FSA and the consolidation of
power within the Bank of England) and George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne
Abolishes FSA and Boosts Bank, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2010 (describing the FSA‘s
elimination and the Bank of England‘s consolidation of power). The proposal contemplates
that the FSA will be brought under the umbrella of the Bank of England and split into two
(and potentially more) regulators: one responsible for micro-prudential regulation of
financial institutions, and the other for overseeing consumer protection and markets.
18. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 6-7 (canvassing the broad range of institutional
models exhibited within various countries).
19. The objective of prudential regulation is generally to manage risk within financial
markets. Micro-prudential regulation refers to regulation aimed at managing risks (i.e.
insolvency risk) to individual financial institutions, while macro-prudential regulation is
aimed at managing systemic risks to the financial system.
20. The objective of conduct of business regulation is, broadly speaking, to ensure fair
dealing between market participants.
21. Conspicuous in their absence from this list of functions are the monetary policy
functions typically performed by central banks. While these functions clearly represent an
integral aspect of financial regulation, to the extent that the integration of monetary policy
and other regulatory functions manifest a largely distinct set of issues, and are not directly
relevant in terms of the regulation of OTC derivatives, they reside beyond the scope of this
paper.
22. Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 5.
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that integrated regulators will frequently manifest important differences in
terms of their regulatory objectives, supervisory responsibilities,
enforcement powers, and jurisdictional scope.23 These differences will, in
turn, affect the extent to which a particular regulatory regime will be able
to translate the theoretical advantages of integrated regulation into practice.
The theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation
canvassed in Part II(b) are perhaps best understood when integrated
regulation is itself compared alongside its principal institutional
competitors: the institutional, functional, and objectives–based models of
financial regulation.24 As described in Table 1.1, each of these competing
models is premised on the existence of multiple specialist regulators. The
institutional model contemplates the allocation of responsibility amongst
specialist regulators on the basis of distinctions between particular species
of financial institutions (i.e. banks, brokerage firms, or insurance
companies), irrespective of the specific lines of business or activities
individual institutions actually pursue.25 Conversely, the functional model
allocates responsibility on the basis of distinctions between specific lines of
business or activities.26 The functional model thus contemplates, for
example, that a single specialist regulator might enjoy jurisdiction over the
regulation of mortgage financing activities across all types of financial
institutions. As Charles Goodhart et al. observe, the distinction between
the institutional and functional models may prove insignificant where the
activities of financial institutions are primarily focused within particular
segments of the financial services industry.27 Where, however, financial
institutions are engaged in activities across multiple industry segments, the
distinction between these competing institutional models becomes
simultaneously more meaningful and more complex.
The third principal institutional competitor of integrated regulation is
the objectives-based model. As its name implies, objectives-based
regulation divides responsibility between specialist regulators on the basis
of specific regulatory objectives. Goodhart et al., for example, have

23. Jose de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated
Financial Sector Supervision (World Bank, Working Paper 3096, 2003) (describing the
results of a survey of fifteen countries that have adopted integrated supervision).
24. A number of potential variations of these basic institutional models—most notably
those based on unified oversight boards and/or support functions—have been advanced. For
a discussion of these variations, see Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Issues in the
Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 22 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/213, 2000)
(discussing the possible composition, purposes, and limitations of unified oversight boards).
25. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE
NOW? 144 (Routledge 1998).
26. Id.
27. Id. Thus, for example, banks as an institution are primarily engaged in the function
of providing commercial banking and deposit-taking services.

AWREYFINALIZED_ONE

2010]

1/5/2011 10:27 PM

OTC DERIVATIVES

7

articulated an objectives-based model premised on six objectives: systemic
risk; non-systemic prudential; retail conduct of business; wholesale conduct
of business; financial exchange; and competition regulation.28 A second
subspecies is the so-called ―twin peaks‖ model.29 The twin peaks model
contemplates two regulators: one responsible for prudential supervision
and the other for conduct of business regulation, consumer protection, and
corporate governance. The division of responsibilities between the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is an example of this
model. Ultimately, as with integrated regulation, manifestations of each of
these models vary widely in practice and—as illustrated by the current
patchwork regulatory regime governing the U.S. financial services
industry—may even be pursued concurrently.30
TABLE 1.1: INTEGRATED REGULATION AND ITS PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITORS
Institutional Model
Number of
Basis for Allocating
Examples
Regulators
Responsibility Amongst
Regulators
Integrated Regulation
One
n/a
U.K. (current),
Germany,
Japan
Institutional Regulation

Multiple

Functional Regulation

Multiple

Objectives-based
Regulation

Multiple

The species of financial
institution (i.e. bank, brokerage
firm, insurance company,
investment fund, etc.)
The lines of business or
activities pursued (i.e.
commercial banking,
investment banking, retail
brokerage, proprietary trading,
investment management, life
insurance, pensions, mortgage
financing, etc.)

U.S., Canada

Identified regulatory objectives
(i.e. prudential, conduct of
business, consumer protection).

U.K.
(proposed),
Australia, U.S.

U.S., Canada

28. Id. at 159.
29. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW
CENTURY (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 1995) (describing the twin peaks
model).
30. The author was thwarted in his attempts to identify a single jurisdiction that
employed a regulatory structure premised exclusively on either the institutional or functional
approaches.
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There are those who view the structure of financial regulation as a
second-order issue.31 Pursuant to this view, the key determinants of
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness are not related to institutional
design, but are, rather, attributable to such variables as independence,
accountability, articulation of clear regulatory objectives, allocation of
sufficient financial and human capital, and effective enforcement powers.32
However, as illustrated in greater detail below, it is perhaps more accurate
(and useful) to envision these variables as being intermingled with issues of
institutional design.33 Furthermore, to the extent that institutional design
plays a role in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, it
is clearly important in its own right.34 We begin our examination,
therefore, by canvassing the primary sources of theoretical support for
integrated regulation.
B.

Principal Theoretical Support

The shift toward integrated regulation has taken place within an
environment characterized by two broad trends: (1) the increasing
international mobility of capital and the resulting globalization of
competition within the financial services industry; and (2) the integration of
banking, securities, and insurance markets.35 These trends have generated
complex linkages within and between financial markets and blurred
historical distinctions between many markets and instruments.36 The
widespread use of securitization, for example, has both strengthened and
rendered more complex the relationship between traditional commercial
banking and capital markets. Many credit derivatives, meanwhile, exhibit
31.
32.
33.
34.

Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 3.
Id. at 6-9.
Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 8.
Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Regulator, 2 FSA
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, May 1999, at 5 (exploring whether, independent of the financial
services regulated firms provide, there exists an optimal regulatory structure for the
financial services industry).
35. See Arthur Wilmarth, The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 passim
(2002) (providing a detailed account of the emergence of financial conglomerates and
arguing that current regulatory policies are inadequate for the purpose of policing them);
Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 8-11 (discussing the supervision of financial
conglomerates and competitive neutrality as justifications for regulatory integration);
GOODHART ET AL., supra note 25, at 142-144 (arguing that, inter alia, increasing
internationalization has implications for institutional structure of financial regulation);
Briault, supra note 34, at 12 (discussing how increased internationalization and competition
has blurred the traditional distinctions separating types of financial products and firms);
Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing integrated regulation as a response to the
integration of banking, securities and insurance markets).
36. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3.
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characteristics of securities, insurance, and debt instruments.37 The
ongoing globalization and integration of financial markets38 has made the
gathering and analysis of market information by, and coordination
amongst, financial regulators simultaneously more vital to the delivery of
effective regulation, more complex, and, ultimately, more costly. It is
within the context of such complex and dynamic global financial markets
that the theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation most
strongly resonate. Broadly speaking, these arguments are premised upon
the potential of integrated regulation to generate economies of scale and
scope and thereby reduce the coordination, information and other
transaction costs of regulation relative to institutional models
contemplating a multiplicity of regulators.
The most prominent theoretical argument in support of integrated
regulation is that it enables regulators to adopt more comprehensive or
holistic approaches toward financial regulation, in essence reflecting the
trends toward the globalization and integration of financial markets.39 This
potential derives from two primary sources. First, the integration of market
surveillance, registrant, compliance, disclosure, reporting, and other
information systems facilitates the aggregation of data across a broader
range of sources,40 generating an economy of scope equal to the resulting
reduction in coordination costs relative to systems characterized by
multiple regulators.41 To the extent that regulators are thereby able to build
a more complete picture (and understanding) of various risks within and
across firms, markets, and the financial system, one would expect the
aggregation of these systems to contribute still further toward the
fulfillment of regulatory objectives.
Second, the integration of
management functions within a single regulator manifests the potential to
break down institutional barriers to effective communication and
cooperation, thus reducing the coordination costs associated with, for
37. Briault, supra note 34, at 14.
38. A process which, while perhaps slowed by the global financial crisis, has by no
means ceased.
39. Briault, supra note 34, at 12-17; Eilís Ferran, Examining the U.K.‟s Experience in
Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 257, 277 (2003);
Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3. In a survey conducted by Martinez and Rose,
fourteen out of fifteen respondent countries identified this issue as factoring into their
decision to move toward integrated regulation. Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 9. See
also Her Majesty‘s Treasury [H.M. Treasury], Financial Services and Markets Bill: A
Consultation Document. Part One. Overview of Financial Regulatory Reform, at 8, H.M.
Treasury Press Release (July 1998) (presenting comments from former U.K. Chancellor of
the Exchequer Gordon Brown on the announcement of the creation of the FSA).
40. Briault, supra note 34, at 18; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 13-14; Cihak &
Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9.
41. Within which regulators would presumably need to negotiate and implement
information-sharing mechanisms in order to achieve the same level of aggregation.
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example, (1) the development and articulation of clear and coherent
regulatory mandates, (2) the generation of integrated legal and regulatory
frameworks which are both competitively neutral and free of gaps,42 (3) the
evaluation and prioritization of risks, and (4) the allocation of scarce
regulatory resources toward where they are likely to yield the greatest
social benefits.43
Integrated regulation, its proponents assert, thus facilitates the
adoption of a broader, more comprehensive, and more nuanced regulatory
outlook across firms, markets, and the financial system, ultimately with the
objective of identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing risks and taking
coordinated regulatory action. It is frequently argued, for example, that
integrated regulators possess a comparative advantage with respect to the
monitoring of financial conglomerates44 insofar as they are better
positioned to ensure that these firms (1) are adequately capitalized across
their various lines of business, and (2) have put in place sufficient
organization-wide risk management systems.45 It is similarly argued that
integrated regulators are better positioned to address cross-sectoral and
industry-wide issues such as money laundering, financing of terrorism,
consumer education, and, importantly for the present purposes, the
regulation of OTC derivatives markets.46 On the same basis, integrated
regulators find themselves, in theory, better positioned to understand and
address potential systemic risks.47
A second, and related, source of theoretical support for integrated
regulation flows from the hypothesis that the lower information and
coordination costs derived from the integration of information systems and
management functions enable integrated regulators to more swiftly and
effectively identify, evaluate, and respond to the emergence of new
regulatory challenges.48 This hypothesis proceeds broadly as follows.
First, to the extent that integrated regulators are engaged in market
surveillance across all firms and markets, they are, in theory, more likely to
observe new market developments.49 Second, once these developments
42. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 11; Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9; and
Martinez & Rose, supra note 22, at 7-8.
43. Ferran, supra note 39, at 284. This is precisely the premise underlying the FSA‘s
―risk-based‖ approach to regulation.
44. Firms operating across the full spectrum of financial markets.
45. Briault, supra note 34, at 14; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 10. This
argument may be less persuasive with respect to jurisdictions with smaller or less advanced
financial markets. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24.
46. Clive Briault, Revisiting the Rationale for a Single National Financial Regulator,
16 FSA OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, Feb. 2002, at 6, 19-21.
47. Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 2, 7.
48. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9.
49. There exists a potentially persuasive counterargument that specialist regulators are,
owing to the narrower, more focused scope of their jurisdiction, more likely to identify
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have come to light, integrated regulators (given their holistic outlook) are
also more likely to appreciate the full nature and extent of both the
attendant risks as well as the likely impact of regulatory (in)action. Indeed,
one would expect this to be particularly true for developments which
transcend historical distinctions between financial institutions and markets
or, perhaps more to the point, jurisdictional boundaries between multiple
specialist regulators. Finally, where a regulatory response to a particular
market development is required, integrated regulators are likely to incur
lower transaction costs50 in connection with the design and implementation
of regulatory action51 relative to the more complex—and likely
politicized—process of doing so within a regime characterized by multiple
regulators.
The third principal theoretical argument in support of integrated
regulation is that it imbues integrated regulators with de facto
accountability. This argument proceeds from the observation that, relative
to a system characterized by a multiplicity of competing regulators with
potentially overlapping jurisdictions, the opportunity for integrated
regulators to shift the blame for regulatory failures is effectively
foreclosed.52 Proponents argue that this generates strong incentives for
integrated regulators to articulate clear mandates, to pursue these mandates
vigorously, and to instill within market participants clear expectations
about the nature and level of regulatory protection they will receive.53
Perhaps more importantly, high levels of de facto accountability contribute
(along with mechanisms which ensure sufficient de jure accountability) to
the amelioration of concerns, discussed in Part II(c), that integrated
regulators may be particularly susceptible to abuses of power and
regulatory capture.
Proponents frequently advance several other, arguably secondary,
theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation premised on the
generation of economies of scale and/or scope. It is often asserted, for
example, that insofar as they represent a ―one-stop shop,‖54 integrated
emerging regulatory issues within their purview. However, given the blurring of traditional
distinctions between institutions, markets, and financial instruments, both institutional and
functional regulators are, arguably, increasingly likely to exhibit a form of regulatory
myopia insofar as their limited purview may constrain them from observing all of the
information necessary to fully appreciate the emergence or significance of a particular issue.
50. Including, importantly in many cases, time.
51. Including any related internal reallocation of regulatory resources and/or
responsibility.
52. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 25, at 152; Ferran, supra note 39, at 295; Abrams
and Taylor, supra note 23, at 12, 15; Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 10. Once again,
this is a consequence of the lower coordination costs flowing from the integration of
management functions within a single regulator.
53. Ferran, supra note 39, at 295.
54. Id. at 279.

AWREYFINALIZED_ONE

12

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/5/2011 10:27 PM

[Vol. 13:1

regulators generate transaction cost savings for both regulated firms (who
need only deal with a single point of regulatory contact) and consumers
(who are spared the potentially daunting prospect of having to navigate
through an alphabet soup of regulators in order to acquire information or
lodge a complaint). It has also been argued that the scale enjoyed by
integrated regulators enables them to pursue large infrastructure
investments, such as new market surveillance or information technology,
which might be cost prohibitive for smaller specialist regulators.55 Finally,
it has been observed that the reduced coordination costs flowing from the
integration of management functions within a single regulator provide
integrated regulators a comparative advantage in terms of their ability to
pursue effective human resources strategies.56 Given the importance of
developing and retaining human capital as a necessary pre-condition to the
generation of effective public policy—especially in the context of complex,
rapidly evolving global financial markets—this comparative advantage, if
realized, might very well prove significant.
C.

A Critical Perspective

The theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation provoke
three species of response from its critics.57 First, critics argue that
integrated regulators face a host of potential challenges in connection with
the extraction of the theoretical economies of scale and scope described
above. Second, they argue that the integration of management functions
may generate negative consequences in terms of diminished accountability
and the sub-optimal balancing of competing regulatory objectives. Finally,
critics advance that integrated regulation is itself sub-optimal to the extent
that integrated regulators are, by their very nature, incapable of harnessing
the potential benefits of regulatory competition. This third argument
deserves particular attention because it is the only one of the three species
55. Abrams and Taylor, supra note 23, at 13; Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9.
56. Abrams and Taylor, supra note 23, at 14. Specifically, integrated regulators may be
better positioned to offer their personnel more varied and challenging opportunities, along
with tailored internal training programs and career planning services. Id.
57. A fourth response, not examined here, is that the transition costs of migrating
toward an integrated regulatory model (for those jurisdictions presently employing multiple
specialist regulators) are likely to outweigh any savings generated by the information,
coordination, or other transaction costs of regulation. These potential transition costs
include those stemming from (1) the loss of key personnel and, as a result, human capital
and institutional memory; (2) mismanagement of the integration process; (3) the prospect
that the process will be captured by special interests; and (4) the integration of potentially
divergent organizational and regulatory cultures. Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority [APRA], Report to Messrs Corrs Chambers Westgarth from John Palmer, FCA,
APRA Doc. S/1473964/1, § 5.5.2 (July 15, 2002); Taylor and Abrams, supra note 24, at 16;
Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 11.
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of response that can be viewed as providing a measure of positive
theoretical support for institutional models characterized by multiple
regulators. I begin, therefore, by examining the case for regulatory
competition.
The salutary and deleterious effects of regulatory competition have
been the subject of intense debate for decades.58 Proponents of regulatory
competition argue that competitive pressures within a system characterized
by multiple regulators will enhance innovation, choice, and efficiency, and
ultimately result in the optimal level of regulatory intervention into
58. The theory of regulatory competition has perhaps most frequently been advanced
(and rebuked) within the context of inter-state (including European Union) competition for
corporate charters and, to a lesser extent, the dual (federal/state regulated) banking system in
the United States. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the
Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002)
(arguing that competition among states for corporate charters through regulation generates
undesirable incentives); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992)
(discussing the potential pitfalls of competition among states for corporate charters); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (examining whether there
is still competition for corporate charters among states); Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985)
(analyzing state competition for corporate charters); Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (discussing
Delaware‘s success in the regulatory competition for corporate charters); Roberta Romano,
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate
Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006) (examining the legal innovation in corporate law
among competing states).
The theory has also been advanced (and, again, rebuked) within the context of
securities laws and, specifically, issuer disclosure laws. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital
Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997) (analyzing the potential for international
competition within the field of securities regulation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition
Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and
Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. L.J. 447, 448 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Competition Versus
Consolidation] (analyzing the merits of regulatory competition in the context of securities
regulation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757 (2002) (discussing the benefits of regulatory competition in the field of issuer
disclosure); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure] (arguing against an ―issuer choice‖ system of competitive
securities regulation); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalized Market: Who
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997) (discussing regulation of
transnational transactions in corporate equities); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano,
Empowering Investors] (proposing a competitive, market-oriented approach to securities
regulation); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (comparing competitive issuer
disclosure regulation with competitive state corporate regulation).
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privately ordered markets. Implicit within this line of reasoning is the
conviction that, by generating incentives for regulators to avoid poor
decision-making, regulatory competition can act as an antidote to potential
behavioral biases.59 It is similarly argued that, insofar as multiple
regulators are able to give voice to a broader range of constituencies that
might otherwise find themselves marginalized by an integrated regulator,
regulatory competition represents something of a safeguard against both
potential abuses of power and regulatory capture.60 In these latter two
respects, the case for regulatory competition can be seen as addressing
concerns, discussed in greater detail below, that an integrated regulator
may exhibit characteristics of a monopolistic ―regulatory leviathan.‖
Indeed, the potential to constrain the actions of self-interested megaregulators represents perhaps the most significant theoretical benefit of
regulatory competition in this context.61
Ultimately, however, the case for regulatory competition (and with it
the positive case for institutional models premised on multiple regulators)
is riddled with theoretical and practical shortcomings. First, there exists a
threshold question as to precisely how a competitive environment will
materialize within a system characterized by multiple regulators, each
operating within clearly defined and mutually exclusive areas of
responsibility. Within such an environment, it would be reasonable to
expect regulatory ―products‖ to exhibit low price elasticities, thus
constraining the possibility of welfare enhancing regulatory arbitrage.
What this suggests, perhaps surprisingly, is that regulatory competition
within such systems requires a significant level of jurisdictional ambiguity
and/or overlap in order to generate a market for regulation. However, as
amply illustrated by the U.S. experience regulating OTC derivatives
markets described in Part III, such ambiguity and/or overlap provides
fertile ground for inter-agency turf wars, potentially resulting in regulatory
systems perceived by market participants as unduly complex, uncertain,
unresponsive, and costly.62

59. Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16
TRANSNAT‘L L. 111, 112, 117-118 (2002) [hereinafter Choi, Channeling Competition];
Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 58, at 2365.
60. Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note 58, at 454; Roberta S.
Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United
States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 495, 544 (2003).
61. Choi, Channeling Competition, supra note 59, at 112.
62. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK‘S AND
THE US‘S GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 15-17, 62, 65, 78 (2007) [hereinafter
Bloomberg
Report],
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/NY_SchumerBloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf; Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note
58, at 465.
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Furthermore, unlike regulatory competition for corporate charters
within a federal system63 (where regulated actors may enjoy a significant
degree of mobility and, thus, choice), the prospect of vibrant interjurisdictional (if not necessarily intra-jurisdictional, inter-regulator)
competition for financial regulation is undermined by the reality that
financial institutions will, generally speaking,64 find themselves subject to
the applicable regulatory regimes in each jurisdiction in which they
conduct business. Accordingly, the potential gains from regulatory
arbitrage are, arguably, likely to be outweighed in many instances by the
desire to access domestic financial markets—especially those of large,
strategically important jurisdictions such as the U.S. and U.K.
A second shortcoming of the case for regulatory competition is the
apparent blind spot it manifests with respect to the negative externalities
associated with pervasive regulatory arbitrage.65 It seems reasonable to
suggest that the benefits derived from regulatory competition will flow
primarily66 to (1) the financial institutions which engage in regulatory
arbitrage and (2) the regulators who offer the most competitive legal and
regulatory frameworks. At the same time, however, and as vividly
evidenced by the fallout from the global financial crisis, the costs of
regulatory failure within a globally integrated financial system are all too
often borne by a far broader cross-section of society. On the basis of this
apparent disequilibrium and the enormous negative externalities it
manifests, there appears to be some support for the proposition that
regulatory competition may contribute to the production of socially suboptimal regulation.
Finally, it is worth observing that the theoretical benefits of regulatory
competition have not been empirically established and, generally speaking,
do not appear to have translated well into the practical realm.67
63. This also would apply for quasi-federal systems such as the European Union.
64. Various ―passport‖ systems currently in operation in jurisdictions such as Canada
and the European Union being the most notable exception to this general rule. Broadly
speaking, these systems contemplate that market participants can engage in activities within
―host‖ jurisdictions provided that they are in compliance with the securities laws in their
―home‖ jurisdiction.
65. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1393.
Regulatory competition theory implicitly relies on arbitrage as a mechanism for transmitting
market information to regulators respecting the relative competitiveness of their regimes.
66. Although not exclusively, as it must be conceded that enhanced innovation, choice,
and efficiency are likely to manifest potential positive externalities as well.
67. See Coffee, supra note 58, at 450, 457 (explaining that there are significant costs
associated with regulatory competition, which, although not inherent in the ―pure theory of
regulatory competition,‖ ultimately present themselves in ―institutionally complex
environments‖); Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1396-97
(noting that proponents of issuer choice have failed to show how regulatory competition
enhances social welfare); Karmel, supra note 60, at 544-45 (listing several practical
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Accordingly, assertions that systems characterized by regulatory
competition possess competitive advantages in terms of their ability to
address behavioral biases and regulatory capture may not ultimately be as
persuasive as they initially appear. Furthermore, as explored in greater
detail below, and in Part IV, problems of behavioral bias and capture can
both be addressed, at least to a certain extent, via the judicious design and
implementation of accountability, independence, and transparency
mechanisms.
Beyond the positive case for regulatory competition, critics emphasize
a number of potential deficiencies with the theoretical arguments in support
of integrated regulation. First, critics observe that the theoretical
economies of scale and scope derived from the integration of management
functions will often prove exceedingly difficult to harness in practice.
Extracting these economies will be at least partially contingent upon the
extent to which integrated regulators are, for example, able to foster (1)
healthy and functioning management structures and decision-making
processes and (2) shared organizational cultures.68 Yet, fostering these
organizational qualities may prove to be amongst the most difficult
challenges facing integrated regulators,69 especially where integration is
effected by way of the merger of multiple specialist agencies. Second, the
scale of integrated regulators may result in excessive bureaucracy and other
diseconomies of scale,70 representing yet another challenge to their
effective management.
Even where integrated regulators successfully address these
challenges, critics argue that the theoretical case for integrated regulation
overstates the magnitude of the potential economies of scale and scope.
Along this vein, several commentators have cautioned against overstating
the trend toward integration within global financial markets.71 Indeed,
while there certainly exists a (shrinking) cadre of true financial
conglomerates, the business models of the vast majority of financial
institutions are still built around core specialties in, for example, banking,

problems observed among competing securities regulators but overlooked by economic
theory).
68. Ferran, supra note 39 at 291-92; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 17.
69. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 18.
70. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 11. But see Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24,
at 17 (suggesting that diseconomies of scale more likely reflect the quality of management,
rather than the size of the organization).
71. Interestingly, while integration of this sort might have once been considered
horizontal consolidation, the blurring of traditional distinctions raises the question of
whether, for example, the merger of a commercial bank (originating loans) and an
investment bank (repackaging and distributing these loans via securitization) might not
actually be considered a form of vertical consolidation.
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securities, or insurance.72 Simultaneously, however, recent history suggests
that it is precisely these financial conglomerates, along with more
integrated markets, such as those for OTC derivatives, which pose the
greatest systemic risks. Accordingly, they warrant the lion‘s share of
regulatory scrutiny. Nevertheless, insofar as the integration of firms and/or
markets represents the exception rather than the rule, either now or in the
future, there exists a legitimate question as to whether the adoption of more
comprehensive or holistic approaches toward regulation, as facilitated by
the lower information and coordination costs associated with integrated
regulation, will yield real world benefits in terms of regulatory outcomes.
Furthermore, as Eilis Ferran has observed, any potential economies
realizable by regulated firms under an integrated legal and regulatory
framework (stemming from, for example, a reduction in compliance costs)
are likely to hinge not on institutional design (i.e. the number and
complexity of rulebooks), but rather on the substantive requirements
thereby imposed upon firms.73 This observation finds tentative support in
preliminary findings that suggest that the economies of scale and scope
generated by integrated regulators may in fact be relatively small when
compared with the overall costs of regulation.74
Critics also question whether the adoption of a comprehensive or
holistic approach toward financial regulation necessarily requires an
integrated institutional architecture.75 Integration is by no means the only
mechanism available for enhancing market surveillance, risk assessment, or
coordination. Committees of regulators, memoranda of understanding, and
institutional models premised on a ―lead regulator‖ may also prove
effective in these regards.76 Nevertheless, to the extent that it reduces the
transaction costs associated with these activities relative to such
mechanisms (and competing institutional models), integrated regulation
arguably enjoys a comparative, albeit contingent, advantage.
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, critics of integrated regulation
observe that the integration of management functions raises the prospect of
significant unintended—and decidedly negative—consequences stemming
from (1) diminished accountability and (2) the sub-optimal balancing of
competing regulatory objectives. In terms of diminished accountability,
72. Ferran, supra note 39, at 277; see also Wilmarth, supra note 35, at 254-57
(suggesting that smaller banks will continue to focus on providing personalized financial
services, while larger banks will focus on providing sophisticated capital market services).
73. Ferran, supra note 39, at 284.
74. GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 25, at 154; Ferran, supra note 39, at 284; Kenneth
Mwenda & Alex Fleming, International Developments in the Organizational Structure of
Financial Services Supervision (Sept. 20, 2001) (World Bank Financial Sector VicePresidency Seminar, Working Paper, 2001).
75. Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note 58, at 450.
76. Briault, supra note 34, at 15; Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 8-9.
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critics assert that the same concentration of power which imbues an
integrated regulator with such a high degree of de facto accountability
gives rise to a concomitant risk that it will become, in the words of one
observer, ―an overmighty bully, a bureaucratic leviathan divorced from the
industry it regulates.‖77 This concentration of power gives rise to a related
concern that integrated regulators are more prone to regulatory capture.
Indeed, both logic and experience suggest that these risks are very real. In
order to mitigate them, therefore, the de facto accountability associated
with integrated regulation should ideally be accompanied by mechanisms
that ensure sufficient de jure accountability. These mechanisms might
include (1) clearly articulated regulatory objectives, (2) mechanisms which
ensure that these objectives are pursued in a transparent manner, (3)
benchmarks against which the performance of the regulator can be
objectively evaluated, (4) formal reporting and performance review
processes overseen by the legislature, and (5) an independent body with the
jurisdiction to review regulatory action.
The integration of management functions is also the source of
concerns respecting the sub-optimal balancing of competing regulatory
objectives. It is unavoidable that integrated regulators will be charged with
responsibility for pursuing a broad range of regulatory objectives. It is
equally unavoidable that these objectives will frequently come into conflict
with one another. An oft-cited example of this species of conflict is that
which materializes in the context of a potential bank failure. While
disclosure of the potential failure would further the objectives of market
transparency and potentially consumer protection, disclosure might also
undermine financial stability. An even more omnipresent conflict, and one
which will be explored in greater detail in Part IV, is that between
maintaining market confidence, protecting consumers, and deterring
financial crime, on the one hand, and promoting globally competitive
domestic financial markets, on the other. Indeed, wherever an integrated
regulator is faced with the complex task of balancing competing regulatory
objectives, there exists the risk that a sub-optimal balance will be struck, or
that one or more of these objectives will be outright subordinated.78
Ultimately, however, it is contestable whether striking the optimal balance
between competing regulatory objectives is a challenge at all unique to
integrated regulation or whether, perhaps more realistically, it is one that
77. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 15. See also GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 25, at 153-54
(noting that a regulator may become so large and powerful that its power may become
excessive).
78. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm‘r, U.S. SEC, Putting Investors First in Regulatory
Reform, Remarks at Compliance Week Annual Conference (June 3, 2009) (transcript
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/28/making-investors-a-priorityin-regulatory-reform/) (explaining that the conflict of duties, which arise from having a
single consolidated regulator, may ultimately lead to certain duties being subordinated).
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haunts regulators of all institutional stripes.
Having canvassed the sources of theoretical support for and against
integrated regulation, along with the positive case for models based on
multiple regulators, the time has come to test these theoretical hypotheses.
The Petri dishes for these tests will be the pre-crisis regulatory regimes
governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S. and U.K.
III. TESTING THE THEORY: COMPARING THE U.S. AND U.K.
EXPERIENCES REGULATING OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS
A.

The Regulation of OTC Derivatives Markets: A Case Study
The regulation of OTC derivatives markets represents a compelling
case study against which to test the theoretical hypotheses explored above
for two principal reasons. First, and most immediately, the (mis)use of
certain types of OTC derivatives played a prominent role in the thick of the
global financial crisis. Complex collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
underpinned the ―originate and distribute‖79 lending model that precipitated
the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and facilitated its spread throughout the
financial system. The resulting correction unleashed a wave of uncertainty
(and, consequently, illiquidity) within CDO and related markets. This
liquidity crunch generated negative balance sheet implications for financial
institutions and, ultimately, precipitated the flight of assets and collateral
calls which triggered the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and,
in September, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. September 2008, would
also see AIG—putatively the world‘s largest insurance company—brought
to its knees as a result of massive speculative trading in credit default
swaps (CDS) on CDOs.80 Each of these global financial titans was subject
to regulatory oversight in both the U.S. and U.K.
It is AIG, however, that arguably represents the most intriguing case.
Regulated primarily as an insurance company on both sides of the Atlantic,
the downfall of AIG was ultimately attributable to OTC derivatives trading
at its London-based (but French regulated) subsidiary, AIG Financial
Products Corp (AIGFP). Given the scale of AIGFP‘s derivatives-related
operations, and its significance to AIG‘s bottom line, both of which were
apparent on the face of AIG‘s public filings,81 it is curious that the
79. Rather than continuing to hold debt unhedged on their balance sheets the ―originate
and distribute‖ model contemplates that lenders will repackage the debt and distribute it to
third party investors via securitization. Amongst other implications, this has the effect of
reducing or even eliminating the lenders‘ exposure to borrower default and, thus, reduces
the incentives of lenders to invest resources in establishing and monitoring creditor quality.
80. See William Sjostrom, Jr, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009)
(providing a detailed account of AIG‘s derivatives operations, how they precipitated the
firm‘s downfall, and the subsequent bailouts).
81. For example, AIG‘s 2007 Annual Report disclosed a USD$9.5 billion operating
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operations of AIGFP did not attract greater regulatory scrutiny from either
the FSA or the Office of Thrift Supervision, its primary U.S. regulator. As
will be explored in greater detail in Part IV, examining the likely
explanations for this apparent oversight yields potentially valuable insights
regarding the optimal structure of financial regulation.
Secondly, and as amply illustrated by the global financial crisis, OTC
derivatives markets pose numerous challenges for financial regulators.
These challenges stem from, inter alia, (1) their size and systemic
importance; (2) the complex linkages they generate between derivative,
underlying, and related markets; (3) the opportunities they generate for
opportunistic behavior, market manipulation, and welfare reducing
regulatory arbitrage; and (4) the extent to which they defy ―traditional‖
categorization as banking, securities, or insurance markets. These
challenges span the entire spectrum of objectives pursued by financial
regulators, from enhancing market efficiency and protecting consumers to
ameliorating systemic risks. Indeed, OTC derivatives have become the
very embodiments of the increasing integration and complexity of global
financial markets. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the nature of these
challenges play strongly to the theoretical strengths of integrated
regulation. Nevertheless, as will be explored in greater detail below,
integrated regulation, in practice, has arguably proven no more effective in
responding to the challenges of regulating OTC derivatives markets than
other institutional models. Perhaps nowhere is this divergence of theory
and practice more clearly evidenced than in the regulatory experiences of
the U.S. and the U.K.
B.

The U.S. Experience

The origins of OTC derivatives regulation in the U.S. can be traced
back to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,82 Exchange Act of
1934,83 and Commodity Exchange Act.84, 85 Although modern OTC
loss attributable to the operations of AIGFP. Id.
82. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933)).
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(1934)).
84. Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15
(1936)).
85. The Future Trading Act (FTA) of 1921, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 42 Stat. 187 (1921)
(enacting the first derivatives-related regulation to be enacted in the United States, imposing
a prohibitive tax on grain futures not traded on an authorized board of trade, and giving the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate authorized boards of trade upon
evidence that they would comply with statutory conditions respecting, inter alia, transaction
recordkeeping, market manipulation and admission of members). The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, found the enactment of the FTA to be an unconstitutional use of the taxing power
to regulate exchanges; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). The FTA was subsequently
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derivatives markets would not emerge for another four decades, the path
dependency and resulting institutional schism created by these New Deal
reforms would have a profound impact on subsequent developments.
Enacted in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929, the dual objectives of
the Securities Act are to (1) require that investors receive material
information concerning securities being offered for sale to the public; and
(2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of
securities to the public.86 The Securities Act governs the sale of securities
in the primary market, mandating, subject to certain exemptions, the
disclosure of material information through the registration of securities
with the SEC and the issuance to investors of a prospectus in connection
with any distribution of securities. The SEC itself was established under
the Exchange Act, which, inter alia, governs the trading of securities in the
secondary market. Importantly, the requirements of both the Securities Act
and Exchange Act are triggered, with certain prescribed exemptions, only
with respect to instruments that fall under the definition of a ―security.‖87
Enacted in 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act conferred upon the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate authorized boards
of trade (or ―contract markets‖) and to license brokers trading futures
contracts88 in commodities such as grain, butter, cotton, rice, mill feeds,
potatoes, and eggs.89 Upon designation, the Commodity Exchange Act
reenacted under Congress‘s inter-state commerce power as the Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat.
998, codified as 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1922), the constitutionality of which was ultimately upheld by
the Supreme Court in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
86. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a
et seq), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
87. Securities Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq, ss. 2(a)1, 3 (defining a security as ―any
note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities [including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof], or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a ‗security,‘ or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing‖). None of these categories of security has historically
been interpreted as encompassing OTC derivatives.
88. A futures contract is a type of derivative contemplating the purchase or sale of a
commodity in the future at a pre-determined price.
89. The Commodity Exchange Act thus expanded upon (and superceded) the Grain
Futures Act. See generally Daniel Fischel, Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of
New Futures Contracts, 59 J. BUS. L. S85 (1986) and Roberta Romano, The Political
Dynamics of Derivatives Security Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997) (discussing
how the Commodity Exchange Act did little to alter the process for contract market
designation established under the Grain Futures Act).
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imposed upon contract markets requirements respecting, amongst other
matters, transaction recordkeeping and the admission of members.90 The
Commodity Exchange Act also introduced new penalties for fraud and
market manipulation, set speculative position limits, and imposed conduct
of business requirements.91 Administration of the Commodity Exchange
Act fell to a new agency, the Commodity Exchange Commission, which
was created as a division of the Department of Agriculture. Importantly,
while the regulatory regime created under the Commodity Exchange Act
was expressly designed to govern all contracts for the sale and future
delivery of specified commodities, Congress made no attempt to define a
―futures contract.‖
Following the watershed reforms of the 1930s, the structure and
substantive regulation of U.S. derivatives markets remained largely
unchanged until the early 1970s. Then, in 1972, in the wake of the collapse
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME), a designated contract market under the Commodity
Exchange Act, began trading futures contracts on foreign currencies.92
That same year, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), an offshoot
of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), was created and registered with
the SEC to trade in futures on individual securities.93 Motivated in large
part by these developments,94 Congress enacted the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA).95 The primary thrust of the
CFTCA was to create the CFTC as an independent agency (analogous to
the SEC) for the purpose of regulating futures and commodity options
markets. The CFTCA conferred upon the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate all transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for
future delivery and all options thereon, subject to a savings clause designed
to preserve the jurisdiction of the SEC.96 In addition, the CFTCA expanded
90. Fischel, supra note 89, at S87; Romano, supra note 89, at 17.
91. Romano, supra note 89 (governing, for example, the segregation of customer
accounts).
92. Todd Petzel, Derivatives: Market and Regulatory Dynamics, 21 J. CORP. L. 95, 97
(1995).
93. Id. at 98.
94. Romano, supra note 89, at 24-25 (enumerating the motivations behind the
enactment of the CFTCA. First, the moves by the CME, CBOE, and CBOT into new nonagricultural derivatives such as precious metals and currencies exposed both (1) the need to
extend the scope of regulation to cover previously unregulated derivatives and (2) that these
non-agricultural derivatives were beyond the traditional competence of the Department of
Agriculture. Compounding matters, rapid food price inflation had resulted in a perception
[fueled by vested interests] that better commodity markets regulation was required).
95. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
96. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, s.2(a)1(A) (establishing that notwithstanding the introduction of
this exclusivity clause, the CFTCA did not provide any further clarity regarding the
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the scope of the Commodity Exchange Act to include previously
unregulated commodities and ―all other goods and articles, and all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or
in future dealt with.‖97 The CFTCA also required designated contract
markets to demonstrate that trading in a proposed contract would not be
contrary to the public interest.98
Frictions between the CFTC and other federal regulators first emerged
during the legislative wrangling that preceded the enactment of the
CFTCA. The SEC lobbied vigorously for a carve-out from what it
perceived as the CFTC‘s overly broad exclusive jurisdiction clause. On its
face, the clause granted the CFTC jurisdiction over trading in futures and
options contracts, not just on designated boards of trade, but also on ―any
other board of trade, exchange or market.‖99 The U.S. Treasury
Department also lobbied to curtail the scope of the clause100 and ultimately
obtained the so-called ―Treasury Amendment,‖ which stipulated that the
CFTC‘s jurisdiction would not extend to transactions in foreign currencies,
security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts,
repurchase options, government securities, mortgages or mortgage
purchase commitments (unless such transactions involved the sale thereof
for future delivery conducted on a designated contract market).101
Importantly, trading in these instruments was, at the time, almost
exclusively the purview of large commercial and investment banks. The
Treasury Amendment thus effectively carved out much of the fledgling
OTC (inter-bank) market, as it then existed, from CFTC jurisdiction—
much to the benefit of the U.S. banking industry. It would be the first, but
by no means only, occasion on which federal banking regulators102 would
intervene to oppose regulatory intervention into OTC derivatives markets.
The building jurisdictional tensions between the SEC and CFTC only
intensified after the enactment of the CFTCA. In September 1975, the
CFTC granted a CBOT application for designation as a contract market in
respect of futures on Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)

definition of a ―contract for sale of a commodity for future delivery‖ [i.e. a futures contract]
for the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act).
97. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, s. 1(a)(4).
98. CFTC Guideline 1, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,217 (June 1, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
300).
99. Romano, supra note 89, at 34.
100. Letter from Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel of the Treasury Department to
Sen. Herman Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
(July 30, 1974) (reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5887, 5887-5889).
101. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, ss. 2(c)(1) and (2).
102. Principally the U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency.
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mortgage-backed pass-through certificates.103 This action provoked a letter
from SEC Chairman Roderick Hills to the CFTC in which he asserted both
that GNMA certificates and contracts for their future delivery constituted
―securities‖ under the Securities Act and Exchange Act and that the
CFTCA did not deprive the SEC of its jurisdiction over such instruments.104
In response to the letter, the CFTC issued a memorandum that detailed the
statutory foundation of the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction and refuted
Chairman Hills‘s assertions.105 The CFTC would subsequently approve
applications from the CBOT as well as other commodity exchanges for
futures contracts on 90-day U.S. Treasury bills and, later, longer-term U.S.
Treasury bonds.106
Jurisdictional tensions would come to a head once again in the context
of the CFTC‘s 1978 reauthorization hearings.107 The SEC, along with the
CBOE, General Accountability Office (GAO), and Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) challenged the CFTC‘s jurisdiction over futures
contracts and options on securities.108 The SEC argued, inter alia, that (1)
futures contracts and options on securities were functionally equivalent; (2)
futures on securities affected the market in the underlying securities; and
(3) the CFTCA had generated confusion around the extent to which persons
purchasing securities could rely upon the protections of federal securities
laws.109 For these reasons, the SEC argued that it was ―appropriate and
necessary that the SEC‘s jurisdiction extend to futures contracts and
options with respect to securities.‖110 Once again, however, the SEC‘s
arguments failed to convince Congress: the Futures Trading Act of 1978111
essentially reaffirmed the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction over trading in

103. See
CFTC.gov,
History
of
the
CFTC
in
the
1970‘s,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1970s.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2010).
104. David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal
Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599, 1637 (1986) (citing SEC-CFTC
Jurisdictional Correspondence, compiled at [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,117).
105. Id.
106. CFTC Release No. 323-77 (Aug. 2, 1977); CFTC Release No. 92-75 (Nov. 26,
1975).
107. The CFTCA established the CFTC as a so-called ―sunset agency,‖ requiring
periodic reauthorization by Congress.
108. PHILIP JOHNSON & THOMAS HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 26 (Little, Brown,
2nd ed. 1989); Fischel, supra note 88, at S88; Gilberg, supra note 104, at 1638; Romano,
supra note 89, at 34.
109. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the H.
Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 181-219 (1978) (testimony of
SEC Chairman Harold Williams).
110. Id. at 216.
111. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865.
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futures markets—including futures contracts and options on securities.112
The 1980s represented a period of revolutionary change and dramatic
growth within OTC derivatives markets. Perhaps most significantly, the
1980s would witness the emergence, growth, and proliferation of swaps
markets.113 It is widely believed that the first swap (a currency swap
between IBM and the World Bank) was entered into in 1979.114 The
emergence of markets for interest rate (c. 1981), commodity (c. 1986), and
equity (c. 1989) swaps would follow over the course of the next decade.115
These markets would go on to grow and mature for several years,
seemingly under the jurisdictional purview of neither the CFTC nor the
SEC. At the same time, and irrespective of the fact that the vast majority of
swap transactions involved federally regulated banks both as market
makers and counterparties, the growth and proliferation of these markets
were apparently not viewed by federal banking regulators as meriting
regulatory intervention.
The 1980s also represented a period of increasing strain in the
relationship between the CFTC and other U.S. financial regulators. In
February 1981, the SEC granted a CBOE application to trade options on
GNMA certificates, taking the position that the Commodity Exchange Act
did not affect the SEC‘s exclusive jurisdiction over options on securities
traded on national securities exchanges.116 The CBOT challenged the
SEC‘s approval of the application on the basis that GNMA certificates
were commodities under the Commodity Exchange Act and, accordingly,
that options on GNMA certificates fell within the CFTC‘s exclusive
jurisdiction. In a split decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit ruled for the CBOT, finding that the SEC had violated the CFTC‘s
exclusive jurisdiction by authorizing the CBOE to trade the options.117
While the SEC appealed the decision, the appeal was subsequently vacated
112. Id. § 2(13) (amending Commodity Exchange Act to require communications with
the SEC, Treasury, and Federal Reserve with respect to areas of overlapping concern and to
consider their views when approving applications for trading in futures on government
securities).
113. Fundamentally, a swap is simply a series of forward obligations to acquire or
dispose of an asset in the future at a predetermined price.
114. Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of
Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J.
CORP. L. 379, 383 (1999) (citing JACK MARSHALL & KEN KAPNER, UNDERSTANDING SWAPS
6-7 (John Wiley & Sons 1993)).
115. Id.
116. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,577, 22 SEC
Docket 186 (February 26, 1981).
117. Bd. of Trade v. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 677 F.2d 1137, 1161 (1982) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the savings clause in the Commodity Exchange Act was designed to
preserve the SEC‘s jurisdiction over all security options—including options on GNMA
certificates).
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as moot as a result of the Shad-Johnson Accord.118
In February 1982, the SEC and CFTC reached an armistice in the form
of the Shad-Johnson Accord.119 Named after their respective chairmen, the
Shad-Johnson Accord was ostensibly designed to preserve, to the extent
practicable, the traditional roles of the feuding federal agencies.120 The
Accord bifurcated jurisdiction over the regulation of derivatives markets,
stipulating that (1) the CFTC would possess jurisdiction over futures
contracts and options thereon on designated contract markets, along with
futures contracts on exempted securities (other than corporate and
municipal securities) and broad-based indices of securities, and (2) the SEC
would possess jurisdiction over options on individual equities, foreign
currencies traded on national securities exchanges, and non-exempt (nonU.S. government issued) bonds.121 The Accord also mandated consultation
between the SEC and CFTC with respect to the approval of stock index
futures and options on futures.122 The arrangements were subsequently
codified in The Futures Trading Act of 1982 (FTA 1982)123 as part of the
CFTC‘s second reauthorization.
Notably, and over the strenuous
objections of the CFTC,124 the FTA 1982 went beyond the terms of the
Accord to confer upon the SEC a veto power over CFTC approval of stock
index futures and options on such futures which were not broadly-based or
which were otherwise susceptible to manipulation.
The enactment of the FTA 1982 was arguably followed by a period of
relative inter-agency harmony. In 1984, for example, the CFTC and SEC
issued a joint policy statement setting out the species of financial
derivatives that the two agencies believed were suitable for trading.125 This
harmony would, however, prove short-lived. The détente was initially
threatened in 1987 when the CFTC launched an investigation into the
commodity swap operations of Chase Manhattan Bank and announced a
proposal to regulate hybrid and commodity swaps, suggesting that these
118. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n v. Bd. of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
119. CFTC and SEC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation, [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982) [hereinafter ShadJohnson Accord] (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
120. Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431,
1457 (1990) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-384, at 22 (1982)).
121. Shad-Johnson Accord, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) [hereinafter
―FTA 1982‖].
124. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 40-41 (1982) (reprinting a letter from CFTC
Chairman Philip Johnson to Congressman Edward Madison).
125. Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on Futures Contracts
Involving Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issuers, Commodity Exchange Act
Release No. 20,578, 49 Fed. Reg. 2884 (January 24, 1984).
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instruments might constitute unauthorized (and therefore illegal) offexchange futures contracts.126 The threat of more burdensome exchangestyle regulation imposed by a regulator with little formal expertise in
banking—and, perhaps more importantly, with whom (unlike federal
banking regulators and Congress) it had not previously cultivated a
relationship—was understandably a source of anxiety for the U.S. banking
industry and, in the view of many observers, a catalyst for the subsequent
migration of commodity swaps markets to overseas financial centers such
as London.127
The simmering turf war between the SEC and CFTC would come to a
rolling boil in 1988-89. In February 1988, SEC Chairman David Ruder
testified before Congress that futures markets in stock indices had disrupted
underlying markets in advance of the October 1987 stock market crash, and
would continue to do so in the future unless brought within the jurisdiction
of the SEC.128 That same year, the SEC approved an application for trading
in index participation units (―IPs‖), a hybrid security exhibiting
characteristics of both securities and futures. The CME brought an action
claiming that the SEC had impinged upon the CFTC‘s exclusive
jurisdiction. As it had done with GNMA certificates, the 7th Circuit held
that IPs were futures contracts falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the CFTC and, accordingly, that they could only be traded on CFTCdesignated contract markets.129
The decision marked a low point in the dispute between the SEC and
CFTC for two reasons. First, it appears that the CME brought its action not
with the intention of itself offering a competing instrument, but rather
simply to prevent the trading of IPs on SEC-regulated exchanges.130
Viewed in this light, the decision thus served simply to thwart innovation
and competition. Second, the fight over IPs exposed the Shad-Johnson
126. E.g., Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (Dec. 11,
1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34). See Sheila Bair, Regulatory Issues Presented by the
Growth of OTC Derivatives: Why Off-Exchange is No Longer Off-Limits, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS 700 (Robert Klein & Jess Lederman eds.,
Irwin Professional Publishing 1994); Romano, supra note 89, at 360.
127. Bair, supra note 126, at 700.
128. See “Black Monday,” The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987: Hearing on
The Turbulence of Our Financial Markets During That Period, and Proposals For
Structural and Regulatory Reforms Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong. 141-58 (testimony of David Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission) (concluding that changes must be made if the markets are to remain healthy).
129. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 883 F.2d 537 (1989).
130. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1991-S. 207: Hearing on S. 207 Before the S.
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 102nd Cong. 161-90 (1991) (pointing to
how the CME wrote to the SEC arguing that IPs were still considered futures and thus
illegal). See also Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 120, at 1437-38 (noting the SEC
chairman‘s statement that futures exchanges had no desire to trade IPs).
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Accord as fundamentally inoperable, requiring coordination and consensus
that could not be obtained within the context of rapidly evolving
derivatives markets.131 Each of these observations are clearly salient to the
present exploration.
The success of the CME in preventing the
introduction of IPs illustrates how regulatory regimes characterized by
multiple regulators can—rather than enhancing competition—be
manipulated by market participants toward decidedly anti-competitive
ends. The failure of the SEC and CFTC to give effect to the Shad-Johnson
Accord, meanwhile, demonstrates the practical shortcomings of informal
arrangements and memoranda of understanding between multiple specialist
regulators within the context of complex and dynamic global financial
markets.
Yet another significant point in the historical arc of U.S. derivatives
regulation occurred later in 1989, when the CFTC issued a policy statement
in which it purported to exempt swaps from its oversight.132 The policy
statement, issued in response to industry concerns that swaps might be
deemed futures (and thus illegal off-exchange contracts),133 acknowledged
that swaps possessed certain features that distinguished them from futures
contracts.134 The policy statement further explained that, while the CFTC
also viewed swaps as possessing elements which mirrored futures and
options contracts, the agency did not believe that it was the appropriate
time to regulate these instruments. Proceeding on this basis, the policy
statement established a non-exclusive safe harbor for swaps transactions
based on identified distinctions between swaps and futures.135 The policy
statement did not, however, address whether swaps constituted futures
contracts under the Commodity Exchange Act and, thus, left open the
possibility that a court might subsequently hold that these instruments
constituted futures contracts.136 Furthermore, swaps that did not satisfy the
131. Romano, supra note 89, at 358-59.
132. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swaps Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694,
30,694-95 (1989).
133. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES: THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REMAIN,
GAO/GGD-97-50, at 2 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97050.pdf
(noting that swaps and other OTC derivatives faced legal risk of being unenforceable
because of CEA requirements).
134. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swaps Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,696
(1989).
135. The policy statement identified five criteria relevant to determining whether the safe
harbor applied: (1) the existence of individually tailored terms, (2) the absence of an
exchange-style offset, (3) the absence of a clearing organization or margin system, (4) that
the transaction was undertaken in conjunction with a line of business, and (5) that the
transaction was not marketed to the public. Id. at 30696-97.
136. Gibson, supra note 114, at 407-08. Indeed, this possibility became a reality when,
subsequent to the issuance of the policy statement, a federal district court found that certain
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requirements of the safe harbor continued to trade over-the-counter
following the issuance of the policy statement. As a result, the statement
was less than entirely successful in generating greater certainty around the
regulatory treatment of swaps.137
The year 1989 would also mark the beginning of a protracted series of
Congressional debates in connection with the reauthorization of the
CFTC.138 Swaps dealers lobbied vigorously during the reauthorization
process for regulations reflecting the CFTC‘s policy statement in order to
avoid potentially burdensome regulation and reduce regulatory
uncertainty.139 SEC Chairman Richard Breeden and Treasury Secretary
Nicholas Brady meanwhile sought greater legislative clarity respecting
stock index futures, ultimately resulting in a standoff with CFTC
Chairwoman Wendy Gramm.140 After nearly three years of debate, this
process culminated in the enactment of the Futures Trading Practices Act
of 1992 (FTPA 1992),141 reauthorizing the CFTC and conferring upon it the
authority to exempt certain exchanged-traded and OTC instruments from
its oversight. Congress then instructed the CFTC to exercise its new
exemptive authority with respect to, inter alia, swaps and other hybrid
instruments.142 In exercising its exemptive authority, the CFTC (once
again) did not define swaps as futures or otherwise attempt to assert its
authority. Indeed, the CFTC even acknowledged that, were a court to find
that swaps fell within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction, the exemption
would still operate so as to render the instruments legal even if they failed
to meet all the requirements of the exemption.
While this
acknowledgement provided market participants with some additional
comfort, there remained lingering uncertainty insofar as there was nothing
preventing the CFTC from subsequently revoking the exemptions, thus
pulling the rug out from under the maturing swap and hybrid markets.
Any legal certainty provided by the FTPA 1992 was soon eliminated,
OTC energy contracts constituted futures contracts. Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North
Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
137. See Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U.
PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 421, 438-42 (2001) (detailing how swap practices conflicted with
several assumptions made by the CFTC‘s policy statement).
138. See Romano, supra note 89, at 353-368 (describing the legislative history of the
CFTC‘s 1992 reauthorization).
139. Petzel, supra note 92, at 102.
140. Romano, supra note 89, at 362-65.
141. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (FTPA 1992), 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994).
142. The CFTC granted the anticipated exemptions in 1993. See CFTC Regulation of
Hybrid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. § 34 (1994). For swaps to be exempt they had to be between
―appropriate persons‖ including commercial entities or wealthy, sophisticated
counterparties. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 58 Fed. Reg. 5580, 5581 (Jan. 22, 1993);
7 U.S.C. §§ 6(c)(2)(B)(i), 6(c)(3) (2000). Notably, exempted instruments were not exempt
from the manipulation and anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.
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however, when, in December 1994, the SEC and CFTC entered into
simultaneous, yet separate, settlement agreements with BT Securities
Corporation (BT). The settlements stemmed from BT‘s misconduct in
connection with two leveraged swap transactions entered into with its
client, Gibson Greeting Cards.143 That same month, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York entered into an agreement with Bankers Trust New
York Corporation, the parent company of BT, respecting the future conduct
of leveraged derivatives transactions.144 The CFTC asserted jurisdiction,
alleging that BT had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act and had been acting as an unauthorized commodity-trading
advisor.145 Conspicuous in its absence from the CFTC‘s claim, however,
was any assertion that the swaps constituted futures contracts. The SEC
also asserted jurisdiction on the basis that some of the impugned
transactions included embedded options on securities. The SEC alleged
that BT had failed to disclose information and provided incorrect
valuations to Gibson, causing it to make material misstatements in its
financial statements filed with the SEC.146 Less than a year later, the CFTC
entered into a settlement agreement with Metallgesellschaft (MG)
following allegations that MG sold illegal off-exchange energy futures.147
On one level, the BT and MG settlements can be viewed as laudable
responses to questionable market conduct. On another level, however,
these settlements served to highlight the jurisdictional tensions and
resulting lack of coordination between the SEC, CFTC, and federal
banking regulators, adding to the mounting regulatory uncertainty
surrounding OTC derivatives markets.148
Hostilities between the SEC and CFTC would flare up once again in
1997. The first salvo was fired when, much to the consternation of the U.S.
banking industry, the CFTC attempted to assert jurisdiction over the OTC
market in foreign currency options. The CFTC‘s incursion was ultimately
143. BT Sec. Corp., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8579 (Dec. 22, 1994); Enforcement
Proceedings, 94-243 SEC NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 22, 1994; BT Sec. Corp., CFTC No. 95-3
(Apr. 11, 1995), 1995 CFTC LEXIS 76; see also James Overdahl & Barry Schachter,
Derivatives Regulation and Financial Management: Lessons from Gibson Greetings 24:1 J.
FIN. MGMT. 68, 68-78 (1995) (providing a detailed description of the mechanics of the BT
Securities transactions).
144. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 4, 1994).
145. Overdahl & Shachter, supra note 143, at 73.
146. Id.
147. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. et. al., CFTC No. 95-14 (July 27, 1995), 1995 CFTC LEXIS
190.
148. See Overdahl & Schachter, supra note 143, at 75 (―[T]he SEC‘s assertion of
jurisdiction (like the CFTC‘s assertion of jurisdiction) is just that—an assertion[—and]
could be challenged in the future‖). See also Petzel, supra note 92, at 103 (describing the
regulatory ambiguity engendered by the SEC and the CFTC entering into settlements with
BT).
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rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that options on foreign
currencies fell squarely within the scope of the Treasury Amendment.149
Then, in December 1997, the SEC announced a proposal contemplating the
limited regulation of broker-dealers trading in certain OTC derivatives
markets.150 The proposal, referred to as ―Broker-Dealer Lite,‖ was
designed to attract OTC derivatives business—much of which had by this
point fled to other jurisdictions—back to the U.S.151 In a comment letter to
the SEC, the CFTC objected to the proposal on the basis that it encroached
upon the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction.152 The final salvo of 1997 was
fired by the SEC in December when it vetoed a CBOT application to trade
futures and options on futures in two Dow Jones indices on the basis that
they were not sufficiently broad-based to meet the requirements under the
FTA 1982.153
Undaunted, the CFTC continued to press its case, issuing a Concept
Release in May 1998 announcing its plan to re-examine its regulatory
approach toward OTC derivatives markets and, specifically, swaps.154 The
Concept Release was framed by the CFTC as part of a comprehensive
reform effort designed to update its oversight of both exchange-traded and
OTC derivatives markets155 and sought comment on a number of areas of
potential reform.156 The issuance of the Concept Release was motivated,
149. Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997).
150. OTC Derivatives Dealers, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,940 (Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 249 and 249). The proposal contemplated, inter alia, that broker-dealers
selling certain OTC derivatives (including interest rate, currency, equity, and commodity
swaps) would be permitted, under certain prescribed circumstances, to establish and register
with the SEC designated subsidiaries for the purpose of engaging in such transactions.
Designated subsidiaries registered with the SEC would, under the proposal, enjoy relaxed
net capital and margin requirements.
151. Id. at 67,941.
152. Gibson, supra note 114, at 391 (citing Nikki Tait, US Futures Watchdog Says SEC
Exceeding Authority, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at 25 (reporting that in a letter to the SEC
the CFTC stated that the SEC proposal ―would attempt to regulate a large number of OTC
derivatives transactions beyond its jurisdiction, many of which are subject to the exclusive
statutory jurisdiction of the CFTC‖)). Notwithstanding the CFTC‘s objections, BrokerDealer Lite took effect on January 4, 1999. OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,362
(Nov. 3, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. parts 200, 240 and 249).
153. The veto was ultimately overturned by the 7th Circuit Court; Board of Trade v.
SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999).
154. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998) (Concept
Release); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Issues Concept Release Concerning Over-theCounter Derivatives Market (May 7, 1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm;
―CFTC Seeks Public Comment as it Reexamines Oversight of OTC Market,‖ 30 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep (BNA) No. 19, at 721 (May 8, 1998).
155. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,114.
156. Id. The CFTC Concept Release sought comment with respect to, inter alia, eligible
transactions, eligible participants, clearing, transaction execution facilities, registration,
capital, internal controls, sales practices, recordkeeping, and reporting.
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according to the CFTC, by substantial changes within OTC derivatives
markets within recent years, including high profile derivatives-related
scandals such as the BT and MG affairs and the 1995 collapse of Barings
plc as a result of unauthorized (and undetected) OTC derivatives
transactions conducted by trader Nick Leeson.157 The timing of the
Concept Release—a matter of months after the announcement of BrokerDealer Lite—suggests perhaps that the CFTC may have also been
motivated by a desire not to cede jurisdiction to the SEC. The issuance of
the CFTC Concept Release was seen by many as contrary to the intent of
Congress in enacting the FTPA 1992 which, while conferring upon the
CFTC exemptive authority with a view to promoting financial innovation,
competition, and legal certainty, did not expressly confer upon the agency
jurisdiction over OTC derivatives markets.158 Predictably, the CFTC
Concept Release provoked a chorus of objections from market participants,
the SEC, and federal banking regulators.159 Succumbing to the pressure
from both industry and regulators, Congress ultimately introduced
legislation to temporarily bar the CFTC from taking further regulatory
action.160 In the end, the CFTC Concept Release thus only served to further
compound the jurisdictional tensions and regulatory uncertainty
surrounding OTC derivatives markets.161
Not content simply to bar the CFTC from regulating OTC derivatives
markets, Congress next turned its attention to the SEC. As part of the
sweeping financial sector reforms introduced under the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (1999) (GLBA),162 Congress granted the SEC jurisdiction over
swaps and other hybrid products.163 Simultaneously, however, the GLBA
expressly excluded both security-based164 and non-security-based swaps165
from the definition of a ―security‖ under both the Securities Act and
Exchange Act and prohibited the SEC from, inter alia, registering a
security-based swap or promulgating, interpreting, or enforcing rules with
157. See supra sources accompanying note 152.
158. Gibson, supra note 114, at 392.
159. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 767-768 (1999).
160. Financial Markets Reassurance Act of 1998, H.R. 4507, 105th Cong. (2d Sess.
1998) (limiting the authority of the CFTC to alter the regulation of certain hybrid
instruments and swap agreements under the Commodity Exchange Act).
161. See David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who‟s in Charge? Agency Infighting and
Regulatory Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14 (noting tension between
regulators and legislators over derivatives market oversight).
162. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) [hereinafter
―GLBA‖]. The GLBA is most frequently associated with the dismantling of the GlassSteagall Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
163. GLBA § 205.
164. As defined in GLBA § 206(c).
165. As defined in GLBA § 206(b).
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respect to any security-based swap.166
The state of affairs established under the GLBA would prove shortlived. Spurred by a report issued by the President‘s Working Group
(PWG) on Financial Markets in November 1999,167 Congress enacted the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).168 Concerned
that ―a cloud of legal uncertainty‖169 was undermining the U.S.‘s leadership
in financial services, the PWG Report recommended additional
deregulation and exemptions for OTC derivatives markets with a view to,
inter alia, (1) promoting innovation and reducing risk by enhancing legal
certainty and (2) enhancing the competitive position of the U.S. within
global OTC derivatives markets.170 The CFMA attempted to clarify—
although effectively re-drew—the jurisdictional boundaries between the
SEC and CFTC. Amongst other matters, the CFMA redefined hybrid
agreements so as to re-confer upon the SEC jurisdiction over hybrids which
involved a security (including security-based swaps), a jurisdiction which
had been removed only the previous year under the GLBA. In addition, the
CFMA repealed those portions of the Shad-Johnson Accord governing the
regulation of single-stock futures, placing such instruments under the joint
jurisdiction of the CFTC and SEC. The primary thrust of the CFMA,
however, was to exempt OTC derivatives markets from the regulatory
oversight of the SEC, the CFTC, and state regulators. Thus, after 25 years
of jurisdictional feuding, U.S. regulators found themselves largely
prohibited from regulatory intervention into OTC derivatives markets.
Not surprisingly, the enactment of the CFMA ushered in a period of
relative inactivity in the U.S. with respect to the regulation of OTC
derivatives markets. This regulatory stasis stood in stark contrast, however,
with the precipitous growth and proliferation of OTC derivatives
markets.171 Between December 2000 and June 2007, the notional amount
of all outstanding OTC derivatives grew from USD$95.2 trillion to
USD$516 trillion—an increase of 542%.172 In retrospect, this period would
166. See Securities Act, supra note 82, § 2A(a), (b).
167. PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf [hereinafter PWG
REPORT] (report transmitted to Congress).
168. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763 (2000).
169. PWG REPORT, supra note 167, at 1.
170. Id. at 1-2.
171. Erik Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38:3 CONN. L. REV. 393 (describing a pattern of, inter alia, regulatory inaction
during periods of market growth).
172. Serge Jeanneau, Derivatives markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, 28, 31 (June 2001)
and Ryan Stever et al., Highlights of international banking and financial market activity,
BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, 19, 24 (Dec. 2007).
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prove the calm before the storm. Clouds would begin to gather in the
summer of 2007 as rising defaults on U.S. sub-prime residential mortgages
sent ripples through asset-backed securitization markets. The clouds
opened up in March 2008 when investment bank Bear Stearns received a
last minute bailout from the federal government (in the form of a forced
sale to JPMorgan Chase) after two of its hedge funds accrued devastating
losses on thinly-traded CDOs on sub-prime mortgages.173 The storm would
reach hurricane strength in September 2008 when investment bank Lehman
Bros. announced that it was filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
following dramatic losses in its securitization business. Within a matter of
days, the resulting liquidity crisis claimed AIG, which received the first of
several federal bailouts on September 16, 2008.
The events of March-September 2008 spurred U.S. financial
regulators to once again turn their attention to the regulation of OTC
derivatives markets. In March 2008, in the immediate aftermath of the
Bear Stearns bailout, the CFTC and SEC entered into a mutual cooperation
agreement with a view to enhancing coordination and facilitating review of
new derivatives products.174 In November 2008, the CFTC, SEC, and
Federal Reserve Board entered into a memorandum of understanding to
establish a framework for consultation and information sharing on
regulatory issues related to centralized counterparties for CDS contracts.175
In December 2008, the CFTC announced that the CME had certified a
proposal to clear CDS through the CME‘s clearing facilities.176 Then, in
August 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled the centerpiece of the
U.S. federal government‘s new approach toward the regulation of OTC
derivatives markets: the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of
2009, ultimately enacted in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).177
173. The $2 Bailout, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 81; What Went Wrong?, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 22, 2008, at 79.
174. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC, SEC Sign Agreement to Enhance Coordination,
Facilitate
Review
of
New
Derivatives
(Mar.
11,
2008),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5468-08.html.
175. CFTC.gov,
History
of
the
CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_2000s.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2010).
176. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces that CME Has Certified a Proposal to
Clear
Credit
Default
Swaps
(Dec.
23,
2008),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5592-08.html.
177. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 704, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of
the Treasury, Administration‘s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final
Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol Hill (Aug. 11, 2009),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg261.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Release]
(including the proposed text of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009).
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The Administration has characterized the objectives of its new
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets as to (1) guard
against excessive systemic risk; (2) promote transparency and efficiency;
(3) prevent market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market
abuses; and (4) block inappropriate marketing to unsophisticated parties.178
The Act confers upon the CFTC and SEC the authority to require ―swaps‖
and ―security-based swaps,‖179 respectively, to be (1) centrally cleared
through a CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing organization or SECregulated securities clearing agency and (2) traded on a regulated board of
trade, exchange, or alternative swap execution facility.180 A (securitybased) swap will be exempt from the central clearing and exchange trading
requirements if one of the counterparties is not a ―financial entity‖181 or is
using the instrument to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.182 In order to
incentivize greater utilization of centrally-cleared and exchange-traded
instruments, it is likely that the new regime will ultimately impose higher
capital and margin requirements in connection with un-cleared (securitybased) swaps.183 The Act further requires the registration of, inter alia, the
centralized counterparties,184 swap repositories,185 and alternative swap
178. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 177.
179. Taken together, the definitions of ―swap‖ and ―security-based swaps‖ encompass
the vast majority of OTC derivatives instruments. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 721 & 761.
180. Id. §§ 723 & 763. The process of determining whether a particular group, category,
type, or class of (security-based) swap will be subject to the central clearing and exchangetrading requirements can be initiated by either the relevant clearing organization/agency or
the relevant regulator. Clearing organizations/agencies are required to submit to the CFTC
or SEC, as applicable, any group, category, type, or class of (security-based) swaps it
intends to accept for clearing and provide notice of this submission to its members. Id. In
reviewing a submission, the CFTC or SEC will determine whether the submission is
consistent with the core principles of the relevant clearing organization/agency. Id. The
relevant regulator is also required to take into account the following factors: (1) the
existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate
pricing data; (2) the availability of a rule framework, capacity, operational expertise,
resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent
with the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded; (3) the
effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market for such
contract and the resources of the clearinghouse available to clear the contract; (4) the effect
on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing; and (5) the
existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant
clearinghouse or one or more of its clearing members, with regard to the treatment of
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property. Id.
181. The definition includes (security-based) swap dealers, major (security-based) swap
participants and other categories of financial institutions. Id. § 723.
182. Id. This exemption is subject to a notification requirement. The non-financial or
hedging counterparty retains the option to require that the instrument be centrally cleared.
183. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 177. However, the Act only mandates that
the CFTC, SEC, and federal banking regulators, as applicable, set minimum capital and
margin requirements. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 731 & 764.
184. Id. § 725.
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execution facilities which have, over the course of time, emerged and
matured into the private regulatory infrastructure supporting many OTC
derivatives markets.186 These entities (other than centralized counterparties
registered with the SEC) are then required to comply with a set of ―Core
Principles‖ and other requirements articulated in the Act and to design,
implement, monitor, and enforce technical regulation in furtherance of
these principles.187 While the Act does not articulate a similar set of core
principles for SEC-registered centralized counterparties, it does mandate
that the agencies adopt similar rules governing these registrants.188
The Dodd-Frank Act carves up jurisdiction over OTC derivatives
markets by distinguishing between contracts for the sale of a commodity
for future delivery and swaps (subject to CFTC jurisdiction), and securitybased swaps (subject to SEC jurisdiction).189 Simultaneously, however, the
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules
and regulations governing functionally or economically similar products
and entities.190 To this end, the SEC and CFTC have been handed joint
responsibility for fleshing out many of the technical details of the Act.191
The Obama Administration also requested that the two agencies produce a
joint plan for harmonizing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.192
The success of the new U.S. regulatory regime governing OTC
derivatives markets will hinge on a number of as yet unresolved issues.
The approach ultimately adopted by the CFTC and SEC with respect to the
determination of whether a particular group, category, type, or class of
(security-based) swap be will subject to the clearing requirement, insofar as
it will serve to demarcate the perimeter of the new regulatory regime, will
clearly impact the extent to which the Act will be able to achieve its stated
objectives. It appears unlikely, for example, that the tailored CDS on
CDOs at the epicenter of AIG‘s collapse would be deemed appropriate for
central clearing.193 In the same vein, it is an open question as to whether
185. Id. § 728.
186. Id. §§ 733, 763; see also Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives
Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide 11:2 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155 (exploring
the costs and benefits of public and private systems of ordering within the context of OTC
derivatives regulation).
187. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 725, 728, 733 & 763.
188. Id. § 712.
189. Id. §§ 712, 722, 761-763.
190. Id. § 712.
191. Id. These responsibilities include defining the terms ―swap,‖ ―security-based
swap,‖ ―swap dealer,‖ ―security-based swap dealer,‖ ―major swap participant,‖ ―major
security-based swap participant,‖ and ―eligible contract participant.‖ Id. § 712.
192. See SEC & CFTC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION
OF REGULATION (2009) (describing existing conflicts in statutes and regulations).
193. Darrell Duffie, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Markets? 6 (2009),
http://www.pewfr.org/admin/project_reports/files/Pew_Duffie_Derivatives_Paper_FINAL-
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the capital and margin haircuts for un-cleared derivatives will effectively
counterbalance the private incentives of dealers to circumvent centralized
clearing and exchange-trading requirements. Furthermore, the success of
the Act in terms of its systemic protection mandate will depend on whether
centralized counterparties are themselves sufficiently well designed and
capitalized to withstand systemic shocks and whether mechanisms are
established ex ante to effectively manage their failure. Finally, only time
will tell whether exchanges and alternative trading platforms will be able to
deliver the liquidity, price transparency and low transaction costs promised
by proponents of the Act. Each of these issues will, at least in part,
ultimately be conditional upon the materialization of competitive markets
for both trading platforms and centralized counterparties. For these and
many other reasons, it is still too early to predict whether the Act will prove
an effective response to the regulatory challenges posed by OTC
derivatives markets.
The response of U.S. regulators to the emergence, growth, and
proliferation of OTC derivatives markets yield a number of observations.
First, the existence of multiple regulators within the field—each with
uncertain and often overlapping jurisdictions—appears to have increased
the overall costs of regulation. From the perspective of regulators, these
costs include those stemming from, inter alia, the increased coordination
and other transaction costs associated with the resolution of relatively
frequent jurisdictional disputes, along with the attendant opportunity costs
associated with the diversion of regulatory resources away from the design,
promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of substantive regulation in
response to the myriad of challenges posed by OTC derivatives markets.
From the perspective of market participants, meanwhile, the relevant costs
include those incurred in connection with the interpretation of and
compliance with the dense ―thicket of complicated rules‖194 which have
been generated for the purpose of exempting OTC derivatives markets
from regulatory oversight.195 Collectively, these costs have undermined
both the effectiveness of U.S. financial regulation and the competitiveness
of U.S. financial markets.
A second observation stems from the role played by the U.S.
Congress, Treasury Department, and Federal Reserve Board in supporting
the development of OTC derivatives markets. Despite the extensive
involvement of the U.S. banking industry in these markets,196 federal
banking regulators adopted a decidedly non-interventionist stance during
TF-Correction.pdf (briefing paper for Pew Financial Reform Project).
194. Bloomberg Report, supra note 62, at ii.
195. These costs also include switching costs for those market participants who do not
wish to remain exposed to the resulting legal uncertainty.
196. Both in their capacity as dealers and as market counterparties.
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the boom years leading up to the global financial crisis. Indeed, as
evidenced by their opposition to, for example, the CFTC‘s exclusive
jurisdiction clause and 1998 Concept Release, the Treasury and Fed
actively intervened on multiple occasions to block regulatory intervention.
Congress supported these efforts in each instance by enacting legislation—
the Treasury Amendment, the GLBA and, finally, the CFMA—which
constrained the ability of other regulators (the SEC and CFTC in particular)
to legislate the field. The principal recipient of this beneficence was of
course the U.S. banking industry itself, which derived potential private
benefits from, amongst other sources, (1) lower overall costs of regulation
and (2) the absence of market transparency vis-à-vis clients and non-bank
counterparties. This observation lends support to the thesis, developed by
Simon Johnson and others, that the U.S. banking industry has succeeded—
primarily by inculcating a pervasive belief in the benefits of free markets
and their importance in securing America‘s global position—in capturing
both federal banking regulators and Congress.197
These observations have important implications for the present
inquiry. As previously acknowledged, they support the theoretical
hypothesis that systems premised on multiple regulators will incur higher
coordination and other transaction costs.
Simultaneously, and as
proponents of integrated regulation might predict, the fragmentation of the
U.S. regulatory regime (and resulting inter-agency conflict) has resulted in
the perpetuation of a regulatory framework which has become increasingly
unreflective of the structure of the markets which it regulates and
chronically (perhaps terminally) slow in responding to new market
developments.198 The U.S. experience supports the case for integrated
regulation in at least two other important respects. First, the failure of U.S.
regulators to generate substantive regulation in response to risks associated
with OTC derivatives markets resulted in a form of de facto convergence
within the market for regulation, effectively foreclosing the prospect of
welfare-enhancing regulatory competition.199 Second, the role played by
197. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 5-6 (Pantheon Books 2010) (describing Wall Street‘s
powerful and enduring influence on political ideology); see also Robert Weber, New
Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1552013.
198. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 120, at 1451, 1460. As Russo and Vinciguerra
observe, attempts in the U.S. to regulate OTC derivatives markets have frequently followed
a discernable pattern: (1) innovation within derivatives markets, (2) falling outside the
current regulatory framework, (3) spawning jurisdictional conflict between regulators, and
(4) resulting in a regulatory compromise which does little to address risks associated with
OTC derivatives markets or prevent future jurisdictional disputes. Id.
199. The Dodd-Frank Act might change this. Specifically, centralized counterparties,
THE
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Congress and federal banking regulators in blocking regulatory
intervention provides a potential rebuttal (albeit an anecdotal and largely
inferential one) to those who assert that systems based on multiple
regulators will prove less prone to capture. Finally, understanding the
regulatory environment in the U.S. is a necessary pre-condition to
understanding the competitive dynamic which developed between the U.S.
and U.K. in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. As will be
explored in greater detail below, this dynamic was highly influential in
shaping the FSA‘s approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives
markets.
C.

The U.K. Experience

The U.K. has a long tradition of self-regulation. This tradition has
been variously explained on the basis of the U.K.‘s regulatory culture,
broader political and cultural factors, and more grounded policy
considerations such as the expertise, responsiveness, and cost-effectiveness
theoretically associated with regulation generated by private actors.200
Perhaps nowhere has this tradition been more clearly observable—or had a
more profound impact—than in connection with the regulation of U.K.
financial markets.201 Indeed, before the dramatic structural changes
ushered in by the so-called ―Big Bang‖202 and the enactment of the FSA
1986,203 the U.K. relied almost exclusively on private actors, informal
measures, customary understandings,204 and moral suasion on the part of
the Bank of England205 as sources of financial regulation.
exchanges, and alternative swap execution facilities might conceivably compete on the basis
of technical regulation (including requirements for admission for trading).
200. Rob Baggott, Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation,
67 PUB. ADMIN. 435, 442-443 (1989).
201. BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 365-66
(Oxford Univ. Press 1997); LAURENCE GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office 1982); Baggott, supra note 200, at
438.
202. ―Big Bang‖ (never the ―Big Bang‖) refers to the October 27, 1986 restructuring of
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Formerly a private and autonomous association, Big
Bang brought the LSE within the scope of the FSA 1986, abolished minimum commissions,
and eliminated the longstanding distinction between stockbrokers and stockjobbers. Big
Bang also saw the removal of restrictions respecting the organization and ownership of LSE
member firms, thus facilitating for the first time the acquisition of significant interests in
members by other financial intermediaries. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor,
United Kingdom and United States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern
Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 317, 330 (2003).
203. Financial Services Act (FSA), 1986, c. 60 (Eng.).
204. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 320.
205. Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Regulatory Efficiency of a Single Regulator in Financial
Services: Analysis of the UK and Japan, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 23, 35 (2006).
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The FSA 1986 imposed for the first time a statutory framework on the
U.K.‘s self-regulatory infrastructure.
At its core, the FSA 1986
contemplated a two-tiered system of ―co-regulation.‖206 This framework
proceeded from the delegation of specified powers by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI)207 to private sector ―designated agencies‖ (the
first tier). The most important of the designated agencies under the FSA
1986 was, for the present purposes, the Securities and Investments Board
(SIB).208 The SIB was responsible for setting the overarching regulatory
framework and agenda through the issuance of Statements of Principle and
Core Rules of broad application across all financial markets.209 Under the
authorization and oversight of the SIB, day-to-day responsibility for
promulgating, monitoring, and enforcing the vast majority of regulation fell
to a small group of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), recognized
investment exchanges, and professional bodies (the second tier). The
SROs, which were funded and partially managed by their member firms,
included the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), Investment
Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO), Financial Intermediaries,
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), and Life
Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO).210
206. See CHEFFINS, supra note 201, at 367 (employing the term as coined in JOHN AYRES
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 102 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)).
207. Oversight of the SIB under the FSA 1986 was transferred from DTI to H.M.
Treasury in 1992. See Transfer of Functions (Financial Services), 1992, S.I. 1992/1315
(U.K.).
208. FSA 1986, c. 60, § 114 (Eng.); Fin. Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order, 1987,
S.I. 1987/942 (Eng.); Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) (No. 2) Order, 1988, S.I.
1988/738 (Eng.). The SIB was a private company limited by guarantee incorporated
pursuant to the Companies Act 1985. Nevertheless, the SIB exhibited several characteristics
of a quasi-governmental agency. For example, the chairperson of the SIB was selected
jointly by H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England. FSA 1986, c. 60, § 114, sched. 7 (Eng.).
In addition, the agency accounted for the exercise of its powers through regular review
meetings with H.M. Treasury. At the same time, however, the FSA 1986 explicitly affirmed
that the SIB was not subject to the financial and organizational constraints which apply to
government departments; FSA 1986, c. 60, § 116, sched. 9 (Eng.). For a more detailed
description of the SIB, see CHEFFINS, supra note 201, at 366-367 (explaining the SIB‘s role
within the regulatory structure, its powers, and the limits on its discretion).
209. The Statements of Principle articulated standards for any type of investment
business done by any person. The Core Rules covered conduct of business, financial
resources, treatment of client funds, and unsolicited calls. SROs could diverge from the
Core Rules in certain circumstances with SIB permission. SRO rules would further explain,
extend, or qualify the Core Rules as appropriate for the particular investments supervised by
the relevant SRO. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Law of Derivatives: An
International Comparison, at 68 (Jan. 1995) (Austl.).
210. The five original SROs under the oversight of the SIB would in 1994 be
consolidated into three: the SFA, IMRO, and Personal Investment Authority (PIA). As
discussed in greater detail below, much of the impetus for this change would be provided by
dissatisfaction respecting overlaps and possible gaps in the areas of responsibility of the
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Pursuant to the FSA 1986, persons or firms dealing in, arranging
dealings in, and managing or advising on ―investments‖ in the U.K. were
deemed to be engaged in the ―investment business.‖211 Unless exempted,
they were required to be authorized and registered either through
membership in one or more SROs, as applicable, or by the SIB directly.212
The FSA 1986 cast a wide net around the definition of an ―investment,‖
identifying an exhaustive list of instruments which included shares,
debentures, government securities, and, importantly for the present
purposes, options, futures, contracts for differences, and rights and interests
in investments.213 Persons or firms whose business activities were captured
within this net were subject to regulation by the SIB and/or the relevant
SROs governing, amongst other matters, conduct of business, capital
adequacy, financial and transaction reporting, segregation of client
accounts, and custody of client assets.
The most important SRO in terms of the regulation of derivatives was
the SFA. The SFA was responsible for regulating registrant persons and
firms (1) dealing in, arranging dealings in, and advising on all types of
investments, including futures, options and contracts for differences, (2)
managing assets, some or all of which were derivatives instruments,214 and
(3) managing or operating authorized unit trusts or recognized collective
investment schemes, which were dedicated to derivatives.215 Other SROs
played ancillary roles in regulating derivatives. The IMRO, for example,
regulated derivatives transactions, which were ancillary or incidental to a
registrant firm‘s investment management or advisory business. FIMRA
regulated options on securities and equity indices traded on or under the
rules of a recognized or designated investment exchange and used only for
hedging. LAUTRO, meanwhile, regulated the marketing of authorized unit
trust schemes which invested in futures and options.216
In addition to complying with general SIB Core Conduct of Business
(COB) Rules and SFA Rules,217 registrant firms were required to comply
with a number of requirements specifically targeted at derivatives. The
primary thrust of these requirements was to ensure the suitability of
derivatives instruments for investment by certain types of customers. As a
starting point, both the SIB Core COB Rules and SFA Rules distinguished

original SROs. Ferran, supra note 39, at 267.
211. FSA 1986, c. 60, sched. 1, pt. II, s. 12.
212. FSA 1986, c. 60, pt. I, ch. 2, §§ 3, 4; FSA 1986, c. 60, pt. I, ch. 3, §§ 7, 25.
213. FSA 1986, c. 60, sched. 1.
214. Unless the investments managed were primarily securities.
215. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 208, at 67.
216. Id.
217. In addition to the SFA rules, registrant firms need to comply with the relevant U.K.
listing requirements with respect to exchange-traded or ―securitized‖ derivatives.
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between ―customers‖ and ―non-customers.‖218 Customers were then further
divided between ―private customers‖ (primarily individuals and small
business investors) and ―non-private customers‖ (effectively reserved for
sophisticated market counterparties).219 These classifications were highly
significant in that they determined the nature and extent of a registrant
firm‘s obligations toward a given customer (or non-customer). The
greatest obligations were owed to private customers, the least to noncustomers.220
Derivatives-specific regulations governing the relationship between
registrant firms and their private customers included a prohibition against
effecting, arranging, or recommending OTC derivatives to a private
customer unless the registrant firm reasonably believed that the purpose of
the transaction was to hedge against currency risk.221 Registrant firms were
also required to (1) provide private customers with a Derivative Risk
Warning Notice before trading in derivatives,222 (2) warn private customers
of the potential difficulties associated with establishing a proper market
price for, and disposing of, ―non-readily realizable investments‖ such as
OTC derivatives,223 (3) disclose any position knowingly held by the
registrant firm, or any associate, in the same (or a related) investment,224
and (4) where the investment services involved derivatives, put in place a
two-way customer agreement.225 The SFA also provided guidance that a
customer should not be treated as an ―expert‖ (i.e. a non-private customer)
in options and futures unless the customer was experienced in derivatives
of the relevant kind—not just in other investments or types of

218. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 75 (citing SFA
Rule 9-1). Ed. note: many of the SFA, SIB, and IMRO rules are practically unavailable,
except by reference to the report.
219. Id.
220. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 74.
221. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 81 (citing SFA
Rule 5-44; IMRO Ch II Rule 3.13; and SIB Core COB Rule 27).
222. SECURITY AND FUTURE AUTHORITY BOARD, GUIDANCE NOTE TO SFA RULE 5-30.
(Feb. 19, 1996). The Notice described various types of derivatives and sought to explain
their risks. The Notice contained mandatory information respecting commissions,
suspensions of trading, clearinghouse protections, and insolvency. Where relevant, the
Notice also contained information respecting OTC transactions, foreign markets, contingent
liability transactions, and collateral. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra
note 209, at 84-85.
223. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 85 (citing SFA
Rule 5-30(5)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 88 (citing SFA Rule 5-23). A two-way customer agreement was required to
include information, if applicable, regarding (1) whether derivatives transactions may be
undertaken, and (2) the basis upon which the customer would incur any contingent liability.
Id.
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derivatives.226 Lastly, with regard to collective investment schemes, SFA
Rules contemplated marketing and investment restrictions for options and
futures funds, along with special registration requirements for individuals
engaged in their marketing.227 These rules were collectively designed to
protect less sophisticated customers from the perils of trading in derivatives
instruments. Simultaneously, however, these rules adopted a noninterventionist (effectively, a caveat emptor) approach toward the
regulation of derivatives transactions between market counterparties.
The two-tiered framework established under the FSA 1986
formalized—without significantly altering228—a historically fragmented
self-regulatory regime which over time had resulted in the development of
markedly different institutional arrangements and legal regimes governing
banking, securities, and insurance markets.229 Registrant firms were often
regulated by multiple SROs, precipitating a degree of confusion and legal
uncertainty and generating significant inefficiencies.230 Indeed, almost
from the outset, the framework was criticized as unwieldy and unduly
bureaucratic.231 Compounding matters, the SIB was widely perceived as
weak, its only leverage being its nuclear power to derecognize an SRO.232
This perception was re-enforced by a series of high-profile financial
scandals, culminating in the 1995 collapse of Barings plc. The Barings
collapse in particular exposed the importance of effective coordination
between banking and securities regulators within a fragmented regulatory
system.233 These scandals also served to raise questions regarding the
effectiveness of the SROs‘ efforts to prevent misconduct amongst their
members.234 Ultimately, these perceived weaknesses—along with pressure
226. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 78 (citing SFA
Guidance (February 1994)).
227. See Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, (incorporating
amendments to regulations in releases 159, 169, 178, 189, 191, and 198); Companies and
Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 81-82 (citing Financial Services
Regulations 5.07(2), 5.21, 5.23, 5.25(3), and 5.63(1)).
228. One notable exception being the exemption of derivatives contracts from the
application of the Gaming Act 1845. FSA 1986, c.60, pt. 1, ch. 8, § 86. This exemption is
now contained in § 412 of the FSMA.
229. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260.
230. Id. at 265. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, ch. 2, (discussing the likely
ineffectiveness of such ―nuclear‖ powers when they represent the only weapon in a
regulator‘s enforcement arsenal).
231. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260.
232. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 334.
233. See Ferran, supra note 39, at 263 (citing REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING
SUPERVISION INQUIRY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (HM Stationery
Office 1995)).
234. Id. at 267; Jerry Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28
BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 319, 376-77 (2003).
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from both the City (which saw greater formalization as a necessary
response to increasing international competition)235 and Parliament (which
anticipated pressure from the E.U. as a result of its entry into the field of
financial regulation) —swung the tide in favor of greater formalization and
less fragmentation. By the Spring of 1997, the table was thus set for a sea
change in the regulation of U.K. financial markets.
The optimal structure of financial regulation—and, in particular, the
appropriate policy response to the rapid evolution of financial markets and
increasing international competition within the financial services
industry236—was very much a live issue in the 1997 U.K. general
election.237 Within days of its electoral victory, the incoming Labour
government announced its intention to move the U.K. toward a single,
integrated financial regulator.238 As Ferran observes, the government
justified the move toward integrated regulation on the grounds that (1)
―[t]he existing system was failing to deliver [high] standards of investor
protection and supervision . . .;‖ (2) ―[t]he two tier structure under the
Financial Services Act 1986 was inefficient, confusing, and lacked
accountability and a clear allocation of responsibilities;‖ and (3) there
existed the need for a regulatory structure that would reflect the integrated
nature of modern financial markets.239
The U.K. government wasted little time in moving forward. In
October 1997, the SIB was re-branded the Financial Services Authority
(FSA). Over the course of the next several months, most of the existing
designated agencies and SROs would be merged into the FSA ―on a largely
informal and ad hoc basis.‖240 In July 1998, the government published the
Financial Services and Markets Bill in draft form.241 After a ―tortuous‖242
legislative process, the Financial Services and Markets Act243 received
Royal Assent in June 2000. The FSMA created the FSA as the single,
integrated regulator for financial services in the U.K., thus formally
235. Baggott, supra note 200, at 448.
236. See Reforming the City, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 19 (supporting the concept of
an integrated regulatory regime in London).
237. See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 331 (discussing the central role of the
debate over integrated regulation in the 1997 U.K. general election).
238. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260.
239. Id. at 271.
240. Id. at 273 (citing Howard Davies, Law and Regulation, 3 J. INT‘L FIN. MKTS. 169,
169 (2001)).
241. Press Release, Financial Services Authority, Publication of the Draft Bill (July 30,
1998).
242. Grant Ringshaw, Editorial, Crackdown in the City: Slapped Wrists or Heads on
Spikes? Grant Ringshaw Reveals the Plans of the World‟s Most Powerful Financial
Regulator, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 25, 2001, at 5.
243. Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA), 2000, c. 8 (Eng.). The FSMA came
into full force and effect in December 2001.
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absorbing within it the jurisdiction and functions of the SIB, other
designated agencies, and SROs.244 The FSMA identifies the objectives of
the FSA as to maintain market confidence, promote public awareness,
protect consumers, and reduce financial crime.245 The FSA is responsible
for prudential conduct of business and market standards across, inter alia,
the securities, insurance, and banking industries. It is also the U.K. Listing
Authority.
The FSMA is frequently described as ―framework‖246 legislation in the
sense that it is structured around (1) the articulation of high-level objectives
and (2) the conferral upon the FSA of a wide latitude to design and
implement a regulatory regime capable of achieving these objectives.
Accordingly, much of the substantive regulation governing U.K. financial
markets is located not within the FSMA itself, but within secondary
legislation, instruments, and other guidance issued by H.M. Treasury and
the FSA.
Following the same broad approach as the FSA 1986, the FSMA
mandates that any person engaged in a ―regulated activity‖ must, unless
exempted, be authorized by the FSA.247 Regulated activities under the
FSMA include (1) ―dealing in investments,‖ (2) ―arranging deals in
investments,‖ (3) ―deposit taking, safekeeping and administration of
assets,‖ (4) ―managing investments,‖ (5) ―investment advice,‖ (6)
―establishing collective investment schemes,‖ and (7) ―using computerbased systems for giving investment instructions.‖248 The term investment
is defined broadly so as to include, inter alia, ―securities,‖ ―instruments
creating or acknowledging indebtedness,‖ ―instruments giving entitlement
to investments,‖ ―options,‖ ―futures,‖ ―contracts for differences,‖ and
―rights in investments.‖249
Also like the FSA 1986, the FSMA prescribes regulation of both
general and more targeted application to OTC derivatives.250 Regulation of
general application (but nevertheless applicable to OTC derivatives)
includes, for example, the liability imposed upon market participants in

244. ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 637 (Sweet & Maxwell
4th ed. 2006) (1996).
245. FSMA §2(2).
246. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 330; Howard Davies, Integrated Financial
Regulation: Lessons from the UK‘s Financial Services Authority, Speech to the Centre for
Financial
Studies,
Frankfurt
1
(Dec.
5,
2001),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2001/sp86.shtml.
247. FSMA, §19.
248. Id. §22; Id. §§ 2-9, sched. 2.
249. Id. §§10-24, sched. 2.
250. See HUDSON, supra note 244, at 637 (characterizing them as, respectively,
―macroscopic‖ and ―microscopic‖ forms of regulation).
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connection with making misleading statements,251 creating a false or
misleading impression as to the market,252 insider trading,253 and market
abuse.254 Similarly, securitized derivatives offered to the public and
admitted to the Official List maintained by the FSA in its capacity as the
U.K. Listing Authority are subject to the relevant prospectus and disclosure
requirements, along with other continuing obligations under U.K. Listing
Rules.255
Registrant firms are also subject to the requirements set out in the FSA
Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS). COBS rules flow from the
categorization of clients as retail clients, professional clients, or eligible
counterparties in accordance with, effectively, their ostensible level of
financial expertise and sophistication.256 COBS rules require registrant
firms to provide clients with a risk warning statement describing both the
general and specific risks associated with certain designated investments
(such as OTC derivatives) including, inter alia, those relating to leverage,
volatility, and contingent liabilities.257 In addition, COBS rules require that
registrant firms put in place two-way customer agreements in connection
with transactions in such designated investments.258 Like their counterparts
under the FSA 1986, these requirements are motivated by the desire to
protect less sophisticated clients.259 Importantly, however, transactions in
OTC derivatives between eligible counterparties are expressly exempted
from these requirements,260 thus maintaining the non-interventionist
approach adopted under the FSA 1986.
In contrast with the fractured U.S. regulatory regime, the scope of the
FSMA261 has been framed broadly enough so as to clearly bring OTC
derivatives markets within the perimeter of the FSA‘s jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, despite sweeping structural changes, the FSA‘s noninterventionist approach has remained functionally equivalent to both the
regime adopted by the SIB under the FSA 1986262 and—even more
importantly for present purposes—that perpetuated by the alphabet soup of
251. FSMA, §397(1).
252. Id. §397(3).
253. Id. §402(1).
254. Id. §118(1).
255. See HUDSON, supra note 243, at 650-656 (detailing the prospectus and disclosure
requirements).
256. See FSA, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK (COBS), ch. 3 (2010), available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/COBS/3/1 (identifying client classification for
purposes of the handbook) [hereinafter COBS].
257. Id. at ch. 14, §14.3.2.
258. HUDSON, supra note 243, at 667.
259. See id. (noting that the requirement is part of a policy to protect customer rights).
260. COBS, supra note 256, at ch. 1, annex.
261. And, indeed, the FSA 1986.
262. HUDSON, supra note 243, at 663.
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U.S. regulators. The salient question thus becomes: Why, despite the
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, did the FSA
generate and adhere to a non-interventionist—and arguably sub-optimal—
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets?
IV. DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE FSA‘S NON-INTERVENTIONIST
APPROACH TOWARD THE REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKETS
There can be little doubt that the FSA has harnessed many of the
theoretical strengths of integrated regulation. Through the articulation of
regulatory objectives and principles of good regulation, the FSMA provides
the FSA with a single, clear and, arguably, coherent mandate.
Simultaneously, the FSMA confers upon the FSA a great deal of flexibility
in terms of how it goes about achieving its mandate. The FSMA also
establishes a number of mechanisms designed to ensure the de jure
accountability of the FSA to both the U.K. Parliament263 and public.264 The
FSA has pursued large infrastructure projects such as Integrated Regulatory
Reporting (IRR)265 and the Advanced Risk Responsive Operating
Framework (ARROW)266 with a view to reaping the potential economies of
scale and scope associated with integrated regulation. Integration has also
contributed toward the FSA‘s consistently high ranking relative to its
international peers—and especially the U.S. —in terms of the delivery of
263. These mechanisms include the requirement in the FSMA that the FSA exercise its
powers in a way which is compatible with its regulatory objectives. FSMA, §2(1)(a). As
Briault observes, this requirement provides the foundation for the political and legal
accountability of the FSA. See Briault, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing requirements for the
FSA that increase accountability). Other accountability mechanisms established by the
FSMA include (1) a requirement that the FSA make annual reports to H.M. Treasury, which
must be put before Parliament (FSMA, §1, sched. 1), (2) the allocation of power to H.M.
Treasury to appoint the FSA chairperson and board (Id.), and (3) the allocation of power to
H.M. Treasury to order independent reviews of FSA‘s financial affairs (Id. §12) and
commission independent inquiries into financial failures (Id. §14).
264. These mechanisms include a requirement in the FSMA that the FSA engage in
public consultation before exercising its rulemaking powers, including the publication of
draft rules and cost-benefit analyses. Id. §§ 65, 121, 155. In addition, FSA decisions are
subject to review by an independent financial services tribunal (Id. §55), while the effects of
FSA regulation on competition are subject to review by the Director General of Fair Trading
and the Competition Commission. Id. § 160.
265. FSA, BETTER REGULATION ACTION PLAN, PROGRESS REPORT 13 (2006); see also
FSA, INTEGRATED REGULATORY REPORTING (IRR): CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND CERTAIN
INVESTMENT FIRMS (2006) (setting forth the purposes and impacts of the IRR).
266. In a nutshell, ARROW is the FSA‘s integrated model for assessing risk, supervising
registrant firms and targeting thematic work relating to consumers, sectors and multiple
firms.
See
FSA,
What
we
do:
regulatory
approach,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/Approach/index.shtml (last updated Sept. 28,
2010).
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cost-effective regulation.267 This relative cost-effectiveness was, in turn,
one of the key drivers underlying the growth of the U.K. financial services
industry in the years building up to the global financial crisis. Finally,
although not directly attributable to integration, the FSA arguably exhibits
many of the other key determinants of regulatory efficiency and
effectiveness: financial independence, adequate financial resources, and a
comprehensive arsenal of enforcement powers. The FSA might at first
blush thus appear to represent a model institutional framework—in
particular relative to the fractured, and in many respects dysfunctional, U.S.
regulatory regime.
Upon closer inspection, however, it would be unwise to herald the
FSA as an unmitigated success for proponents of integrated regulation.
The FSA is frequently described by market participants as overly
bureaucratic, intrusive, and insensitive.268 In addition, the internal
organization of the FSA—especially within the Risk Business Unit269—still
reflects in many respects historical divisions between the banking,
insurance, and securities industries.270 Indeed, for much of its existence,
the FSA‘s organizational structure revolved more fundamentally around
such sectoral divisions. Finally, there is reason to question the extent to
which the FSA is, in practice, accountable to either the U.K. Parliament or
public. In terms of de jure accountability, the FSMA precludes H.M.
Treasury from directly interfering with the affairs of the FSA outside the
limited circumstance in which FSA regulation is found by the Competition
Commission to have had a significant and unjustified adverse effect on
competition.271 In terms of de facto accountability, meanwhile, the fact that
the FSA is wholly funded by industry levies constrains the ability of
Parliament to exert influence over its affairs via the power of the purse
string. Perhaps even more importantly, this funding model gives rise to the
possibility that the FSA (as a supplier of regulation) may be influenced by
an acute degree of de facto accountability to market participants (as
important consumers of regulation), thus raising the specter of welfare-

267. Indeed, the cost effectiveness of the FSA‘s integrated institutional framework was
arguably apparent from the outset. Specifically, despite the wider scope of its jurisdiction
relative to its predecessor agencies, the FSA cost less in real terms between 1998 and 2002.
Briault, supra note 45, at 16.
268. The Regulator Who Isn‟t There, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2002.
269. The FSA‘s other major regulatory business unit, the Supervisory Business Unit, is
organized on what might be characterized as a functional basis between small firms, retail
firms, major retail groups, and wholesale firms.
270. Indeed, the Risk Group is divided on both a sectoral basis (between banking,
insurance, asset management, and capital markets) and objectives-based basis (between
prudential and conduct of business regulation). FSA Organizational Chart 2010,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/Who/pdf/orgchart.pdf.
271. FSMA, §308.
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reducing public choice and regulatory capture problems. Ultimately,
however, these problems collectively provide a fundamentally
incomplete—and thus unpersuasive—explanation for why, despite the
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the FSA
generated a non-interventionist regulatory regime with respect to OTC
derivatives markets.
A more robust potential explanation for the FSA‘s pre-crisis approach
toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets is that it was a product of
one, or more likely a combination, of (1) poor coordination, (2) the FSA‘s
attempts to balance competing regulatory objectives, (3) incentive
problems which arise for national regulators such as the FSA in context of
regulating globally integrated financial markets, and/or (4) the inherent
limitations of regulation within highly complex and dynamic global
financial markets. Each of these potential explanations manifest important
lessons for policymakers contemplating structural reform of financial
regulation. Perhaps most significantly, none of these potential explanations
arise from challenges that are at all unique to integrated regulation.
A.

Poor Coordination

The FSA has at times struggled to capitalize upon the theoretical
potential of integrated regulation to enhance intra-agency coordination. An
internal report of the FSA‘s handling of the Equitable Life Assurance
Company affair, for example, identified poor communication between
individual regulators within the FSA as a deficiency in its regulation
between 1999-2000.272 The FSA was also criticized by market participants
in 2001 for failing to coordinate the approaches of its various specialist
teams in connection with the introduction of the Integrated Prudential
Sourcebook.273 More recently, the internal audit report of the Northern
Rock crisis identified, inter alia, poor internal communication and
information flow within the FSA, along with inconsistent implementation
of rules and procedures, as contributing toward a sub-optimal supervisory
strategy which allowed warning signs of the pending crisis at the bank to

272. Ferran, supra note 39, at 295 (citing REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY ON THE REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY FROM 1 JANUARY TO 8 DECEMBER 2000, WHICH HER MAJESTY‘S GOVERNMENT IS
SUBMITTING AS EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY LORD PENROSE ¶ 6.2.5 (2001)).
273. Id. (citing Press Release, British Bankers‘ Ass‘n, BBA/LIBA Response to
Consultation Paper 97 – The Integrated Prudential Sourcebook (Jan. 17, 2002)). To the
extent that the events giving rise to these criticisms (and the Equitable Life affair) transpired
within the first few years of the FSA‘s existence, however, one might reasonably attribute
any coordination problems to the growing pains (i.e. start-up costs) of a new and
institutionally complex regulator.
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go undetected.274 Given its record in this respect, it seems at the very least
possible that the information necessary to fully evaluate the risks associated
with the growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC derivatives markets
may not have been gathered, aggregated, analyzed, and/or directed to the
FSA personnel capable of evaluating the probability and potential impact
of these risks and, thereafter, initiating appropriate regulatory action.
Indeed, while the FSA was not responsible under E.U. securities laws for
the supervision of AIGFP, poor coordination—both internally and with
AIGFP‘s French regulators—seems a likely (if only partial) explanation for
why its USD$500 billion London-based CDS operations did not attract
greater regulatory scrutiny. Ultimately, however, it is difficult to assess
whether poor coordination was to blame for the FSA‘s failure to effectively
monitor the operations of AIGFP or, more broadly, the extent to which it
shaped the FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of
OTC derivatives markets.275 Moreover, coordination problems likely
represent at best only one piece of a much larger puzzle.
B.

Competing Regulatory Objectives

A potentially more compelling explanation for the FSA‘s approach
toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets is that it was a product of
the regulator‘s attempt to balance competing regulatory objectives. As the
FSA itself acknowledges, its broad and complex remit invariably generates
situations in which its statutory objectives will come into conflict with one
another.276 As has already been observed, these statutory objectives are to
maintain market confidence, promote public awareness, secure consumer
protection, and reduce financial crime. Beneath these objectives, however,
resides a second tier of regulatory objectives consisting of principles of
good regulation, strategic aims, and outcomes that the FSA is expected to
consider in pursuing its statutory mandate.
It is within this second tier that potential conflicts arise between the
FSA‘s statutory objectives and the objectives of promoting efficient and
internationally competitive financial markets. The principles of good
regulation articulated in the FSMA mandate, for example, that the FSA
discharge its functions with regard to, amongst other matters: (1) the
desirability of facilitating innovation, (2) maintaining the competitive
274. See FSA, Lessons Learned Review of the Supervision of Northern Rock PLC During
the Period 1 January 2005 to 9 August 2007: Executive Summary at 4-7 (March 2008)
[hereinafter Executive Summary] (identifying, inter alia, (1) poor allocation of expertise, (2)
lack of proper training for supervisory personnel, and (3) lack of expertise in prudential
banking and financial analysis as contributing factors).
275. The author‘s request to interview FSA personnel was refused.
276. FSA, How We Evaluate Our Performance – The Outcomes Performance Report
and Developments in Our Approach Since 2002, at 9 (2007).
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position of the U.K. within financial services and markets, (3) minimizing
adverse effects on competition, and (4) the desirability of facilitating
competition between those subject to FSA regulation.277 The FSA has
further identified as strategic aims: (1) promoting efficient, orderly, and
fair markets, and (2) improving its business capability and effectiveness.278
Amongst the FSA‘s desired outcomes flowing from these strategic aims are
that (1) the U.K. be internationally attractive, and (2) the FSA be easy to do
business with.279 Indeed, the FSA has historically taken great pains to
communicate to the marketplace that its general approach is to regulate in a
way which supports competition and innovation with financial markets—
with the promotion of competition, minimizing regulatory costs, making
life easier for regulated actors, and restraint in regulatory intervention
permeating FSA guidance and other literature prior to the global financial
crisis.280 This approach should not ultimately be surprising given that, as
has already been observed, the enactment of the FSMA, and with it the
migration toward integrated regulation, was largely motivated by concerns
regarding the international competitiveness of U.K. financial markets.
The trends toward globalization and integration within financial
markets over the past several decades have sparked intense international
competition within the financial services industry. This competition has
fueled a transatlantic rivalry between New York and London for supremacy
in the lucrative markets for investment banking, sales, and trading services.
While New York has long been acknowledged as the global leader in these
markets, recent years have seen Europe—and London in particular—attract
a larger share of global investment banking revenues.281 Over this period,
London has gained particular momentum in the markets for new public
issuances of equity and debt and, importantly, the structuring of OTC
derivative transactions.282 As of 2006, Europe (with London as its primary
trading hub) accounted for 56% of the estimated USD$52 billion in global
investment banking revenues derived from OTC derivatives transactions.283
Moreover, the increasing inter-relatedness of derivative and cash markets
has conferred upon London an important strategic advantage relative to
277. FSMA, § 2(3)(d), (e), (f) & (g).
278. FSA,
Outcomes
Performance
Report,
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Aims/Performance/opr/index.shtml (last updated Apr.
28, 2010).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., FSA, Better Regulation Action Plan 5 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/better_regulation.pdf (outlining how, inter alia, removing
barriers, and regulating less where possible would improve competition and minimize
regulatory costs).
281. Bloomberg Report, supra note 62, at 10-13.
282. Id. at 54.
283. Id. at 13.

AWREYFINALIZED_ONE

52

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/5/2011 10:27 PM

[Vol. 13:1

New York.284
London‘s ascendancy within the global financial services industry has
been largely attributed to the relative attractiveness of the U.K.‘s legal and
regulatory environment. Specifically, the FSA‘s integrated regulatory
framework, responsiveness, flexibility, and accountability have been
identified as key competitive advantages.285 Viewed from this perspective,
the risks associated with the growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC
derivatives markets generated an acute conflict between the FSA‘s
regulatory objectives—any unilateral deviation from its non-interventionist
approach in order to maintain market confidence, protect consumers, and/or
reduce financial crime within OTC derivatives markets would potentially
jeopardize the U.K.‘s global competitiveness. Maintaining its noninterventionist approach can thus be explained as the by-product of the
FSA‘s attempt to balance these competing objectives. Perhaps most
disconcerting in this respect is the lack of transparency accompanying this
process—the FSA‘s integrated structure having effectively driven this
balancing act underground. That this balancing act may (with the benefit
of hindsight) have proven socially sub-optimal286 ultimately only provides
further fodder for critics of integrated regulation.
The nature of the conflict between the FSA‘s regulatory objectives
brings to mind Simon Johnston‘s thesis respecting the ―soft‖ capture of the
U.S. Congress and financial regulators by the U.S. banking industry. The
principles of good regulation, strategic aims, and outcomes described above
are infused with language designed to emphasize the importance of
minimizing the impact of FSA regulation on the operation of financial
markets. This language reflects what was—prior to the crisis—a broader
prevailing sentiment that unencumbered markets represented the optimal
mechanisms for allocating societal resources. It can hardly be surprising,
therefore, that FSA policy reflected this free market ethos with respect to,
inter alia, the regulation of OTC derivatives markets. Indeed, the potential
for ―soft‖ capture may have been exacerbated in the case of the FSA by its
funding model (which, as described above, relies on industry levies) and
adherence to a ―more principles-based‖ regulatory philosophy (which
contemplates a high level of interaction and cooperation between the FSA
and regulated actors).287

284. Id. at 54.
285. Id. at ii, 10, 12, 17, 54, 65, 80-81 & 86.
286. Which, it must be acknowledged, has not yet been established.
287. See Weber, supra note 197, at 104 and Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial
Innovation: A More Principles-based Alternative?, 5 Brook. J. of Corp., Fin. & Com. L.
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing how ―more principles-based‖ regulatory regimes may be
susceptible to capture).
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Incentive Problems: National Regulation, Global Markets

Prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, few would have argued
that the U.K. had not reaped significant benefits—in the form of, inter alia,
enhanced employment, personal and business incomes and, ultimately, tax
revenues288—from the FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the
regulation of OTC derivatives markets. At the same time, however, as the
effects of the crisis sent ripples through the global economy, the realization
of many of the systemic risks associated with OTC derivatives imposed
substantial costs on market participants and, ultimately, taxpayers residing
outside the U.K. This negative externality exposes a third, and potentially
powerful, explanation for the FSA‘s approach: namely, that national
regulators are unlikely to possess sufficient incentives to take unilateral
action to address systemic risks within global financial markets. More
specifically, while regulators will invariably incur significant direct289 and
indirect290 costs when attempting to address systemic risks, the benefits
thereby generated are likely to be negligible insofar as the jurisdiction will
still be exposed to negative externalities stemming from the failure of
regulators in other jurisdictions to adopt equivalent measures.291 From the
perspective of national financial regulators, therefore, systemic risk
regulation represents a bundle of potentially significant costs without the
guarantee of any corresponding benefits. Viewed in this light, it is possible
to see how the FSA may have reasonably dismissed unilateral intervention
to ameliorate systemic risks within OTC derivatives markets—or to address
regulatory gaps such as those exploited by AIGFP—as being
fundamentally unappealing from a cost-benefit perspective.292
D.

The Inherent Limitations of Financial Regulation

While incentive problems and the challenge of balancing competing
regulatory objectives provide compelling explanations for the FSA‘s
adoption of a non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of OTC
288. See Bloomberg Report, supra note 62 (describing some of the benefits that accrued
to the U.K. as a result of the country‘s regulatory regime).
289. Stemming from, for example, the promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of
systemic risk regulation.
290. Stemming from, for example, the marginal flight of business, and capital from the
jurisdiction.
291. Simultaneously, any positive spillovers will flow at least in part to other
jurisdictions.
292. Although in fairness to the FSA, the incentive problems manifested within this costbenefit calculus were arguably compounded by a degree of ambiguity surrounding the
extent to which the FSA had abrogated responsibility for systemic risk regulation to both the
Bank of England and E.U. policymakers.
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derivatives markets, there exists a potentially far more fundamental—and
troubling—explanation. Modern financial markets are extremely complex.
The frequency and complexity of interactions within and between financial
markets, to say nothing of the nature and pace of change within these
markets, make the timely and comprehensive evaluation of potential risks
an exceedingly difficult, if not entirely unrealistic, prospect. Within such
an environment, it is all but inevitable that regulators will be called upon to
evaluate the probability and potential impact of a myriad of risks armed
with imperfect information and, accordingly, deploy cognitive frameworks
which exhibit elements of bounded rationality.
The current global financial crisis provides a vivid illustration of the
informational challenges posed by the dynamism and complexity of
modern financial markets. It is certainly the case that many of the factors
which contributed to the onset and perniciousness of the crisis—including
global trade imbalances, the growth and systemic importance of
derivatives/securitization markets, increasing use of leverage, and evolving
forms of maturity transformation293—were more or less readily observable.
Other factors, however—such as the flaws within the structure of
derivatives markets and their pricing, over-reliance on sophisticated
quantitative techniques for measuring and managing risk, hardwired
procyclicality, the recycling of risk within the financial system, and the
broader systemic implications of a liquidity crisis within wholesale credit
markets294—were arguably much less apparent, or at the very least
contestable, until fairly late in the day. Furthermore, even in the
circumstance where all relevant information was sufficiently observable ex
ante, accurately predicting the probability, impact, and timing of the
confluence of these factors would have still required a truly sophisticated
understanding of the complex interactions within and between financial
markets. Viewed from this perspective, it seems hardly surprising that the
failure to initially identify, and then accurately assess the probability and
likely impact295 of the growing systemic risks—indeed, in thinking that
many of these factors were actually enhancing systemic resiliency296—was
293. See FSA, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis
11-22 (March 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf
[hereinafter Turner Review] (detailing the causes of the recent financial crisis).
294. Id. at 11-23.
295. See FSA, Memorandum to the Treasury Committee, Recent Turbulence in Global
Financial Markets and Northern Rock‟s Liquidity Crisis 2 (Oct. 9, 2007) (showing that as of
January 2007, for example, while the FSA believed that a ―market correction was likely,‖ it
―attached a very low probability to a tightening of the speed, duration, and scale‖ which
eventually occurred).
296. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report 51 (2006) (―The dispersion of credit risk by
banks to a broader and more diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on
their balance sheets, has helped make the banking and overall financial system more
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a global one.297 That this failure was not only one of regulators but also
one of markets (as evidenced by, inter alia, the failure of pre-crisis CDS
spreads to accurately reflect systemic risks)298 only further emphasizes the
informational challenges posed within modern financial markets.
Historically, the informational challenges encountered within modern
financial markets have been exacerbated within OTC derivatives markets
by virtue of their opacity and the rapidity with which their counterparty
exposures are capable of changing.299 These factors have combined to
render it even more difficult for regulators to identify and evaluate potential
risks within OTC derivatives markets. Nevertheless, the FSA, to its credit,
was in fact able to identify a number of the risks associated with the
growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC derivatives markets prior to
the onset of the crisis. More specifically, successive FSA Annual Reports
and Financial Risk Outlooks identified, inter alia (1) the growth of credit
derivatives markets;300 (2) the backlog of confirmations and other
operational risk issues within OTC derivatives markets;301 and (3) the
complexity of OTC derivatives and attendant risk management problems as
issues of concern.302 Ultimately, however, the FSA failed both to foresee
the role that OTC derivatives would play in the global financial crisis and
to attach a sufficiently high probability and/or potential impact to their
attendant risks so as justify the allocation of resources toward the
implementation of rules designed to impose greater transparency, prevent
market abuse, or mitigate potential systemic risks.303 It must be
remembered, however, that all of this is apparent only with the benefit of
hindsight. Accordingly, rather than viewing these failures as such, it may
be more appropriate to view them (at least in part) as reflecting the
complexity of modern financial markets, the informational challenges

resilient.‖).
297. See Turner Review, supra note 293, at 85 (discussing the international failure to
identify systemic risks).
298. Id. at 46, 109. In fact, CDS spreads within the financial services sector suggested
that risks were at historically low levels. Indeed, it now seems that CDS prices—much like
the insurance markets they so closely resemble—may systemically understate risks in
upswings and overstate risks in downswings.
299. See Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Information Failure and
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L. J. 1457, 1462-63 (1993)
(discussing the difficulties posed to the financial system by the informational failures within
banks and regulatory agencies); Wilmarth, supra note 35, at 467 (discussing the difficulties
regulators face in monitoring OTC markets, which are particularly opaque and change
rapidly).
300. FSA, Annual Reports (2003-2006); FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2002-2006).
301. FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2005-2007); FSA, Annual Reports (2003-2007).
302. FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2002-2007).
303. Although in this final respect, it must be acknowledged that the FSA shared
responsibility with the Bank of England.
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posed thereby and, ultimately, the inherent limits of financial regulation.
There remains one final question: What lessons can policymakers in
the U.S. and other jurisdictions draw from these potential explanations in
terms of the optimal structure of financial regulation? First, as many
critics of integrated regulation have suggested, the theoretical advantages
of integrated regulation in terms of enhanced coordination may prove
exceedingly difficult to operationalize. At the same time, as amply
illustrated by the U.S. example, it must be acknowledged that barriers to
effective coordination will likely exist within all institutional models. To
the extent that the elimination of these barriers may prove less costly within
the context of a single, integrated regulator with a unified management
structure, integrated regulation as a whole may still represent a superior (if
pareto-inferior) model. Ultimately, however, these potential savings must
be weighed against the switching costs associating with any shift toward
greater integration. Second, the results of the FSA‘s attempt to balance
competing regulatory objectives lend credence to concerns that integrated
regulation may promote non-transparent decision-making processes which
could result in the sub-optimal balancing—or even the outright
subordination—of regulatory objectives.
Inferentially, the FSA‘s
experience would also appear to provide a modicum of support for
concerns regarding the vulnerability of integrated regulators to public
choice and regulatory capture problems. The FSA‘s experience in these
regards thus serves to illuminate the potential desirability of proposals,
such as those currently being pursued by the Conservative government in
the U.K, which would see responsibility for prudential regulation,
consumer protection, and competition split between separate specialist
regulators.304 Third, the incentive problems faced by national regulators
(which are ultimately deserving of a degree of attention which is beyond
the scope of this paper) suggest that the benefits of integration—especially
in terms of systemic risk (macro-prudential) regulation—may be the
greatest if pursued at the supranational rather than the national level. This
explanation, along with the failures of inter-jurisdictional regulatory
coordination at the heart of the AIG debacle, bolsters the case for the
development of a more robust global regulatory architecture.
Perhaps the most difficult potential explanation from which to derive
lessons is that there may exist inherent limits on the potential efficacy of
regulation within the context of highly complex and dynamic global
financial markets. On one level, the FSA‘s integrated ―risk-based‖
approach to regulation, premised on evaluating the impact and probability
of risks as a means of prioritizing them and allocating resources, seems a

304. See Enrich & Norman, supra note 17 (describing the elimination of the FSA and the
consolidation of power within the Bank of England).
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prudent course of action within such an environment. On another level,
however, and as amply illustrated by the global financial crisis, the
complexity and rapid pace of change within modern financial markets
(along with our imperfect understanding of them) will almost inevitably
undermine our attempts to accurately assess the probability and likely
impact of potential risks. That the FSA has perhaps not fully grasped this
possibility is evidenced by its recent statement that the crisis was ―the
crystallization of a low-probability, high-impact risk.‖305 Ultimately, it
may not have been that the crisis was the crystallization of a lowprobability risk, but rather that the FSA—along with other regulators and
market participants—fundamentally misjudged its probability. In this light,
perhaps the most important lesson stemming from the complexity and
dynamism of modern financial markets is that we need to recalibrate our
expectations of what financial regulation—irrespective of its institutional
structure—is capable of achieving. As the FSA has long acknowledged,
there will always be failures and it would be both impossible and, in any
event, undesirable to seek to eliminate all risk from within financial
markets.
V.

CONCLUSION

The global financial crisis has prompted policymakers on both sides of
the Atlantic to question their previous approaches toward financial
regulation. The purpose of this paper has been to address a number of
these questions as they relate to the efficiency and overall desirability of
integrated regulation relative to competing institutional models, ultimately
with a view to better understanding the optimal structure of financial
regulation. More specifically, this paper has explored why, despite the
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the U.K. FSA
adopted a non-interventionist regulatory regime governing OTC derivatives
markets that was both functionally equivalent to the fractured U.S. regime
and, arguably, socially suboptimal. There can be little doubt that the FSA
has been able to translate into practice many of the theoretical strengths of
integrated regulation. At the same time, however, the experience of the
FSA has exposed some potential weaknesses of integrated regulation in
terms of (1) poor coordination; (2) the sub-optimal balancing of competing
regulatory objectives; (3) incentive problems for national regulators; and
(4) the inherent limitations of regulation within the context of highly
complex and dynamic global financial markets. Insofar as these potential
weaknesses can be observed across all institutional models, the foregoing
exploration manifest important lessons for those who view identifying the
305. Executive Summary, supra note 274, at 1.
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optimal structure of regulation as key to preventing the next financial crisis.
Does the institutional structure of financial regulation matter? Based on
the foregoing examination, the optimistic answer, it would appear, is only
to a point.

